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ABSTRACT 
ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF CHANGES TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN TAX 
SYSTEM SINCE 1990 
Countries reform their tax systems to improve economic and administrative efficiency, the 
impact on income distribution and their revenue-raising capacity. Globalisation has also 
affected the fiscal autonomy of countries and resulted in the reality of tax competition. 
The South African tax authorities have made significant changes to the tax system in over the 
past 20 years. The first phase occurred after the publication of the Margo Commission’s 
report in 1987 and the second phase followed the work done by the Katz Commission since 
1996. The objectives of the reforms included the improvement of tax administration and 
collection, a re-evaluation of the efficiency and equity aspects of the different taxes, the 
broadening of the tax base, and most important, to bring the South African tax system in line 
with changing international tax practise. 
The main objectives of this study are to give a descriptive overview of the reforms, to 
investigate the economic rationale behind the reforms and to answer the question of whether 
the objectives of the reforms were actually achieved. 
The study fills an important void in the South African literature as it is the first 
comprehensive overview of the tax reforms since the 1990s.The nature of the study is 
qualitative and investigative. An overview of the theoretical literature is presented together 
with some evidence from developing countries. To determine whether the objectives were 
achieved, descriptive statistics are presented using secondary data from South African 
Revenue Service (SARS); National Treasury, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). 
The main findings are that the establishment of SARS contributed significantly to the 
administrative efficiency and revenue-raising capacity of the tax system. The taxing of fringe 
benefits under the personal income tax, the introduction of capital gains tax (CGT) and the 
residence-based principle contributed to the broadening of the tax base. The decrease of 
marginal rates of personal income tax (PIT) to be more in line with the rate on company 
income decreased the possibility of tax arbitrage. The phasing out of the secondary tax on 
companies together with the decrease of the rate of company income tax (CIT) increased the 
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attractiveness of South Africa for capital-exporting countries. Significant tax relief to middle- 
and lower-income earners over various years improved the equity impact. However it did not 
improve the position of the really poor, who are not liable for PIT. The increasing 
contribution of value-added tax (VAT) compensated to the decreasing contribution of trade 
taxes; the fact that the VAT rate has stayed constant, since 1993 is an indication of the 
unpopularity of the tax. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1. 1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
All over the world developed and developing countries adapt their tax systems over time to 
improve their overall performance according to conventional tax norms, and also in 
accordance with changing international tax policy and practise. 
The rationale for these reforms can be contextualized into the primary objectives of taxation 
in any particular economy as identified by Newman (1952, p.2). The revenue-raising 
objective of taxation aims at raising sufficient funds to finance the government expenditure 
programmes. The stabilization objective sees taxation used in a flexible manner as a tool, 
together with expenditure and borrowing, to achieve the stabilization of national income and 
employment, smoothing out fluctuations in economic activity. In addition, taxation is used to 
achieve a more equitable redistribution of income across income groups with different levels 
of income. Tax systems are also reformed to improve the economic and administrative 
efficiency of existing tax systems (Hageman, Jones & Montador, 1988 p.187-197). Through 
regular reforms, a country can work towards a more optimal tax structure to suit the demands 
of the particular economy. 
Furthermore, in the current globalised world with relatively free mobility of capital and 
labour, tax competition is a reality and especially in high income developing countries who 
lose skilled labour and capital to low-tax jurisdictions (Mohapatra, Moreno-Dodson & Ratha, 
2012, p.4). It has therefore become necessary for developing countries to bring their tax 
systems in line with changing international tax practise. According to Bird (2007, p.2), 
“…developing countries exist in a complex and changing international environment, and tax 
outcomes in many of these have been affected, sometimes adversely, by globalisation”. Tax 
policy and practise in developing countries have special features, such as that the income 
base is often very narrow (Tanzi & Howell, 2000, p.308), and often face serious constraints, 
such as lack of administrative capacity (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.146). 
The South African tax authorities have also made significant adjustments to the tax system in 
recent years to improve the performance of the tax system and to adapt to the demands of 
globalisation. Since the 1990s two specific phases of tax reform are of note, following the 
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recommendations of the Margo Commission (1987) and of the Katz Commission (1994) 
(Koch, Schoeman & Van Tonder, 2005, p.193). 
The first phase of tax reforms, after the publication of the Margo Commission’s report in 
1987, was a very challenging period in the history of the South African economy – a period 
of sanctions and disinvestment. During this period the financial account of the balance of 
payments was negative (Freytag, 2008, p.33) and this brought its own fiscal challenges which 
had serious implications for tax revenue. There was massive business disinvestment and 
inflation was relatively unstable, the country experienced increasing brain drain and marginal 
tax rates (MTR) on personal income were very high (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, 
p.154). In addition there was strong international pressure against apartheid (Koch, Schoeman 
& Van Tonder, 2005, p.194). For these reasons the Margo Commission (Chairman: Judge 
Cecil Margo) was appointed to investigate the tax system to alleviate the fiscal challenges 
faced at the time. The reform considered the restructuring of the existing tax structure that 
was hindering economic development by using a base-broadening philosophy. It aimed at 
creating jobs, reducing brain-drain, improving tax compliance and morality, stimulating 
capital formation, encouraging immigration and promoting entrepreneurship (Black, Calitz & 
Steenekamp, 2005, p.154). 
To achieve these aims the major reforms following the recommendations of the Margo 
Commission were the introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT), the decrease in the company 
tax rate and the introduction of the Secondary Tax on Companies (Black, Calitz & 
Steenekamp, 2005, p.154). Especially significant was the gradual elimination of tax-
deductible expenditures and special incentives (Manuel, 2002, p.8) to protect the tax base and 
enhance economic efficiency by minimising distortions, and to decrease the opportunities for 
tax evasion and avoidance, hence decreasing the tax gap at that time (Manuel, 2002, p.3). 
The second phase of tax reform followed the work done by the Katz Commission after 1996, 
which was the first tax commission after the establishment of the new democratic 
government led by the African National Congress (ANC). It is noteworthy that Fjeldstad and 
Rakner (2003, p.1) mentioned democratisation as one of the factors why countries embark on 
significant changes to their tax systems. The new democratic government of South Africa had 
the challenging tasks of constructing a dynamic and modern economy to integrate the country 
into the global economy; of developing appropriate policies to restructure government 
expenditure towards social services and to develop a macroeconomic framework that would 
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stimulate investment and economic growth (Manuel, 2002, p.2). According to Bird (2007, 
p.5) it was also important to focus on their political survival. 
During that period the Katz Commission became aware that the fiscal burden on taxpayers 
was too high and it had to be corrected by decreasing MTRs on individual income and 
nominal rates of corporate income tax, improving revenue collection and expanding the tax 
base (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.154). As a measure for increasing tax revenue, the 
Katz Commission policy focused on increasing economic growth and other interventions and 
ruled out increasing VAT rates (Katz Commission, 1994, p.11). The objectives of the reform 
included improving tax administration and collection, a re-evaluation of the efficiency and 
equity aspects of the different taxes (Katz Commission, 1994, p.11) and, most important, the 
broadening of the South African tax base during this period (Manuel, 2002, p.5). 
An important institutional reform during this period was the establishment of the South 
African Revenue Service (SARS) with the aim of improving administrative efficiency and to 
enhance the revenue-raising capacity (Manuel, 2002, p.3). Another important reform during 
this period was the introduction of the residence-based principle in 2001 as recommended by 
the Katz Commission, (1997, p.9) to broaden the tax base. Special provisions were also made 
for small business to stimulate labour intensity of production and job creation. These tax 
reforms, guided initially by the Katz Commission and afterwards by SARS, have led to more 
efficient tax collection and produced impressive increases in total tax revenue over many 
years showing that the tax base has broadened and tax compliance has improved in such a 
way that it exceeded budget estimates. This allowed for widespread tax relief to individuals 
and companies (Manuel, 2002, p.4). Economic efficiency of the system has improved over 
the years by reforms such as the taxation of fringe benefits and the introduction of the capital 
gains tax (CGT). The latter also enhanced the horizontal as well as vertical equity of income 
taxes (SARS, 2011, p.1). Furthermore, regular adjustments to the threshold of individual 
income tax have released the poorest from paying tax. Since the 1990s South African tax 
authorities have also made significant improvements to align tax policy with international tax 
practice. 
However, from a thorough search of the literature it appears that no study has yet been done 
to critically appraise the extent to which the tax reforms in South Africa since the 1990s have 
achieved the intended goals. This study intends to fill this void. Tax reform in South Africa is 
also a very topical issue following the appointment of a new tax review committee in 2013 
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(South Africa, Ministry of Finance, 2013, p.1) and especially considering the fiscal impact of 
the global recession. 
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTION 
To what extent have the intended objectives of tax reforms in South Africa since the 1990s 
been achieved? 
1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The study has the following objectives in order to answer the research question: 
1. To present an overview of relevant theoretical literature as the foundation for the study on 
tax policy in south Africa; 
2. To explore the empirical literature on tax changes in developing countries, with a specific 
focus on special features of, and constraints facing, these countries, as well as on the 
factors behind the policy adjustments; 
3. To present an overview of the changes to the South African tax structure following the 
work of the Margo and Katz Commissions and to explain the rationale behind these in 
terms of the theoretical and empirical overview; and 
4. To investigate whether the intended objectives with the changes to the South African tax 
structure were achieved in practice. 
1.4 DELIMITATIONS 
The study covers the period from the implementation of the recommendations of the Margo 
Report, from 1990 to 2010. 
1.5 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The nature of the study is qualitative and investigative. According to Creswell (2003, p.182) 
qualitative research is fundamentally also interpretative. As such, the study does not aim to 
prove any hypotheses, but rather to interpret the data in a manner that facilitates the ability to 
derive meaningful conclusions that may lead to further questions to be researched (Cooper, 
Potter & Dupagne, 1994, p.55). A literature review presents an overview of the theoretical 
and empirical literature. 
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Secondary data was used to present some descriptive statistics on the economic impact of the 
most important changes to the South African system since the 1990s. Data was sourced from 
institutions such as SARS, the National Treasury, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). 
1.6 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter Two presents a review of the theoretical and empirical literature. It first explains the 
meaning and relevance of the norms for good taxation and then explores features of tax 
systems of developing countries as well as the factors behind changes to the tax structures of 
those countries. 
Chapter Three focuses on the South African situation. The first part describes changes to the 
South African tax system following the work of the Margo and Katz Commissions. It also 
explains the rationale behind the specific tax changes in the context of the theoretical norms 
as discussed in Chapter Two. The second part presents an economic appraisal of the changes 
to the tax system and tries to answer the question of whether policy makers achieved the 
intended objectives. 
Chapter Four concludes the study and presents recommendations arising from it. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework on the achievements of tax policy and 
practise in recent years in South Africa. It discusses, in Section 2.2, the conventional norms 
of a good tax system. These are relevant for this study as countries make tax changes to 
enhance the performance of their tax systems according to these norms. Section 2.3 focuses 
on the special features of taxation in developing countries as well as on some factors that 
were behind the reforms in these countries. 
2.2. THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
The theoretical literature mentions four conventional norms that a good tax system should 
adhere to: it should promote a more equitable distribution of income; it should be 
economically and administratively efficient; and it should be flexible to be able to be adjusted 
according to the changing economic circumstances. Stiglitz (2000, p.458) added political 
responsibility as an additional norm, and Bird (2007, p.56)
1
 added ‘institutionalisation’ as a 
further requirement for tax reform. 
The following sub-sections provide a descriptive overview of the meaning and relevance of 
these tax norms. 
2.2.1. Economic Efficiency 
An economically efficient tax system is one where the distorting effects of taxes on the 
choices of decision-makers are minimized, or when the excess burden is as small as possible 
(Black et al., 2011, p.167). Although all taxes create a burden in the sense that they decrease 
the real income of taxpayers, they cause an additional or excess burden when they distort the 
decision-making of producers and consumers. 
The factors that determine the magnitude of the excess burden are the elasticity of demand 
and the level of tax rates (Black et al., 2011, p.188). If the demand for a good is elastic, then 
an increase in the price will distort the consumer’s preference to buy the good, so that the 
                                                 
1
 Joseph Stiglitz and Richard Bird are international experts on tax policy and reform. 
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higher the price the less is demanded of the good. The consumer may decide to substitute this 
good with another. The opposite is true if the demand is relatively inelastic. Second, some 
excess burden is generally inevitable because not all goods and services are taxable, for 
example leisure. 
For a tax to be efficient, tax rates need to be set in a way that the percentage reduction in 
quantity demanded of each commodity is the same whether the goods are related or not. This 
is because the excess burden is a consequence of distortions in quantities and not in prices. 
This is also known as the Ramsey or inverse elasticity rule (Rosen & Gayer, 2007, p.356). 
For goods that are unrelated in consumption, economically efficient taxing is one where taxes 
are inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand. In other words, tax rates can be set 
higher for goods that have an inelastic demand (such as toilet paper), and lower for goods 
whose demands are relatively elastic, such as in the case of motor vehicles and furniture. In 
this way economic decisions are distorted as minimally as possible. Tax rates should be set in 
a way that increases in the rate should cause as little excess burden as possible. Low tax rates 
on a large number of goods and services will produce smaller excess burdens and more tax 
revenue than higher tax rates on fewer goods and services that yield the same amount of 
revenue. This proposes that broad-based taxes like income taxes and value added taxes are 
more efficient (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.144). 
In the theoretical sense, an efficient tax system should not have an effect on the economic 
decisions of people, i.e. what to buy or to invest or how much work to do, if all resources are 
optimally allocated. In other words, it should be neutral. However, in reality markets are 
imperfect and an optimal allocation of goods and services that would leave consumption and 
investment decisions neutral is the exception rather than the rule (Black, Calitz & 
Steenekamp, 2005, p.140). If taxes are neutral, it makes the system simpler, avoids unfair 
discrimination between different taxpayers in the economy. Nevertheless, neutrality does not 
necessarily mean that there will be no distortions in the economy and it may be efficient to 
differentiate between various activities for purposes of taxation (Rosen & Gayer, 2007, 
p.354). 
There is a case for tax exemptions, where socially beneficial behaviour needs to be promoted 
by society. These include spending on research and development and pension savings. These 
cases require a thorough analysis of the advantages of departing from neutrality and of the 
shortcomings of complicating the tax system. Thus, the motivation for deviating from 
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neutrality should be really high and have clear and fair justification (Mirrlees et al., 2011, 
p.472). 
The case of negative externalities presents a good example, where the actions of one party 
impose a cost on the other party for which the latter is not compensated (Black, Calitz & 
Steenekamp, 2005, p.37). An environmental tax on a firm that exerts a lot of air pollution is 
not distortive but enhances economic efficiency. Pure economic rents for example, can be 
differently taxed devoid of economic distortions, as a tax on excess return on capital will not 
create a disincentive to investment and savings as they are used to correct for market failure 
(Mirrlees et al., 2011, p.476). For this reason variable tax rates are used to increase the price 
of a harmful activity as a means to discourage the harmful activity. Carbon emission and 
congestion, and alcohol and tobacco consumption are good examples due to the harm they 
cause to those who do not consume alcohol and tobacco, as well as to the population who do 
not benefit from consuming the carbon emissions and end up suffering from related diseases. 
Sin taxes (for example excise tax on cigarettes) therefore enhance economic efficiency. The 
same is true in the case of positive externalities, for example with the provision of education 
which confers more social benefits to a community accruing to even those who do not pay for 
it (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.41). In this case a subsidy or negative Pigouvian tax 
will improve economic efficiency by internalising the marginal external benefit of education 
(Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.40). 
Furthermore, Mirrlees et al. (2011, p.474) suggested that all incomes should be taxed with a 
single rate structure, because different rate structures complicate tax systems and distort 
economic activities and unjustly favour those taxed at lower rates. It also makes tax 
avoidance easier, which affects the revenue-raising potential of the tax. 
2.2.2 Administrative Efficiency 
Administrative efficiency involves minimising both administrative and compliance costs 
which are the costs to government of administering the taxes and the costs incurred by 
taxpayers to comply with their tax obligations (Black et al., 2011, p.193). The writers also 
refer to empirical evidence of cases where compliance costs were significantly higher than 
administrative costs. Stiglitz (2000, p.458) referred to ‘administrative simplicity’ as the norm 
and explains that this means that administration and compliance costs should be low.
2
 
                                                 
2
 Stiglitz (2000, p.464) defines administrative costs as the costs of running the revenue service. 
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Administrative efficiency requires that tax avoidance and evasion be reduced to a minimum 
(Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.146). Tax evasion, or just mere non-payment, can be 
attributed to a culture of non-payment in a society as well as to a lack of ability to pay. It is 
also more relevant in the informal sector, whereas tax avoidance on the other hand occurs 
when taxpayers take advantage of loopholes in the tax system to reduce their tax liability 
(Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.146). This will probably be higher in the formal 
sectors of the economy where tax payers can make use of tax experts to exploit loopholes 
(Fjeldstad, 2003, p.172). The extent of evasion can be measured by the tax gap
3
 (Manasan, 
2003, p.1). Another indicator of tax evasion and avoidance is the potential tax base difference 
between the number of persons who have chosen to register for tax purposes and the number 
of persons employed (Marino & Zizza, 1996, p.3). 
According to (Black et al., 2011, p.196) simplification is a golden rule in designing 
administratively efficient tax systems and they claim that “… Simple tax laws are easy to 
understand and comply with”. Moreover, when a government does not take an active step in 
simplifying the administrative procedures and restructuring the tax system, it is not fair to 
expect more from the staff in terms of administrative capacity and integrity. As a result, 
increased autonomy may lead to greater corruption and mismanagement of taxes (Fjeldstad & 
Rakner, 2003, p.9). 
Other factors that lead to administrative problems are found outside the scope of tax 
administration itself (Fjeldstad, 2005, p.8). Problems in tax administration can be caused by a 
decrease in real wages for administrative staff, as well as by an increase in fiscal corruption. 
To resolve this, it would be important to develop strict internal monitoring and penalties for 
non-compliance to rules and regulations. Nevertheless, hiring and firing may not help 
because corrupt officials work in networks, and firing them on one side may result in them 
being hired in the private sector due to the knowledge they have of the tax system and how to 
manipulate it (Fjeldstad, 2005, p.19). 
Furthermore, because these officials work in networks, keeping inside contacts will 
strengthen their networks. Rotation work could be introduced as a solution but the problem is 
that staying in the same post for short periods of time may lead to uncertainty on the part of 
the employees. Consequently they might use their time in the post to enrich themselves while 
                                                 
3
 The tax gap is the difference between the tax that should be paid and what is actually collected (Manasan, 
2003, p.1). 
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in the post. Corrupt superiors may reassign officials to remote stations as a punishment for 
honesty. The problem of lack of skilled personnel aggravates this problem and makes the 
possibility of rotational work merely impossible in developing countries (Black, Calitz & 
Steenekamp, 2005, p.146-147).
4
 
Literature suggests that the following points be present to ensure that tax administration is 
efficient. First, tax legislation should be simplified because then it is easy to understand and 
to comply with (Stiglitz, 2000, p.465). Second, economic theory states that the higher the 
sanctions the higher the compliance (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.146; Doran, 2009, 
p.112). In other words, if the penalty for non-compliance is harsh then tax payers tend to pay 
their taxes more keenly then when the penalties are not rigid. Sometimes however, the way 
the law is enforced and the rigidity of sanctions reduce the citizens’ trust in the authorities 
and fuel resistance (Fjeldstad & Rakner, 2003, p.10). Third, taxes should be withheld at 
source as is the case in the Pay-As-You-Earn system. In this way the authorities lay their 
hands on the salary before the taxpayers, preventing lags in the operation and ensuring a 
regular inflow of revenue for government. (Heady, 2002, p.7) Finally, incentives for tax 
delinquency should be minimized (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.146). In other 
words, MTRs that are too high should be minimized and the poor should not be taxed 
differently, to avoid them from creating ways to escape the tax system. 
2.2.3 Equity 
An equitable tax system is one which promotes an equitable and fair distribution of income 
(Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.122). The benefit principle and the ability-to-pay 
principle are the two principles on which equity is based. The benefit principle states that tax 
burden should be apportioned to taxpayers according to the benefits they receive (Black, 
Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.122). In other words, the more an individual makes use of a 
public good like a bridge, the more the individual has to pay for this benefit. The ability-to-
pay principle states that people with equal ability to pay should pay the same amount and 
those with more capacity should pay more. This principle incorporates both vertical and 
horizontal equity (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.124). 
Horizontal equity implies that individuals with the same ability to pay taxes should be taxed 
equally, regardless of their specific source of income (Profeta, 2003, p.11), and it is based on 
                                                 
4
 See Section 2.3.1 for problems with tax administration in developing countries. 
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the definition of comprehensive income base. It is however difficult to measure and 
implement. Comprehensive income is anything that makes consumption possible, and 
includes donations, gifts, benefits and etc (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.158). 
Vertical equity states that tax burdens should be distributed fairly across people with different 
abilities to pay (Rosen & Gayer, 2007, p.358). This would imply that higher tax rates should 
apply to higher levels if income, i.e. tax rates should be progressive. 
However, progressive taxation may affect the economic behaviour of taxpayers. Tax systems 
should be designed in a way that reduces to the fullest the efficiency loss associated with 
achieving progressivity. Mirrlees et al. (2011, p.3) claimed that income taxation should be 
simple and realistically reflect taxpayer’s responsiveness at the income levels. In other words, 
the rate structure should reflect the reality of the income distribution and taxpayers’ reaction 
to taxes and benefits at the various income levels, their decision to work and the choice of 
how many hours to work, as well as other responses like tax avoidance, evasion and 
migration. Other characteristics to be considered when determining the rate structure include 
incentives for labour supply, potential earnings power and needs. For the groups more 
sensitive to taxation the argument that they should be taxed more generously is conditioned 
on other characteristics and could constitute unfair discrimination, considering that it creates 
the undesired incentive to acquire the specific characteristics which is favoured by tax laws. 
Therefore, careful attention should be paid to the kind of progressivity desired, which should 
be looked at in terms of people’s lifetime resources and not just their annual income. That can 
be achieved by considering the distribution of expenditure and not just of income, because 
people’s borrowing and savings reflect their changing incomes and necessities over their 
lifetime. Thus the extent of progressivity will vary depending on whether it was measured 
using expenditure or income (Mirrlees et al., 2011, p.473). 
This brings us to the point of simplification of income taxes by reducing exemptions and 
decreasing the rate structure, which will also promote horizontal equality between persons 
(Heady, 2002, p.7). Vertical equity becomes relevant when the tax system is matured or 
developed. At this point public spending and revenues increase which will require a more 
complicated tax regime and higher administration costs. At this point the complicated 
structure will become too costly as it will raise administration costs and will in turn force a 
reduction in complexity (Profeta, 2003, p.16). 
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Governments will be forced to simplify the tax structure by starting to group individuals by 
creating, assigning and choosing the correct rate brackets, in a way that is politically optimal 
for each group. This implies a trade-off in the choice of the number of brackets to use. An 
increase in the number of brackets means that there will be a reduction in expected support 
and a decrease means that administration costs will decrease and revenue will increase. 
Hence it will be possible to increase public spending which in turn can lead to increased 
support from voters. Therefore, a well-developed system is at a point where the costs from 
the system are so high that the need to simplify the tax system is predominant and justified, at 
which point there will be a need for special provisions to achieve political optimality 
(Profeta, 2003, p.13). This is very important because it leads to politically responsible 
behaviour from government. A simplified tax system tends to be more transparent and this 
way the burden to each tax payer is clear (Stiglitz, 2000, p.467). 
There is an important trade-off between work incentives and income distribution, hence it has 
been pointed out that taxes on income and benefits are the right apparatus because their rates 
can be adjusted to the desired progressivity. Ahmad and Stern (1989, p.1065) are of the 
opinion that non-cash fringe-benefits should be included in personal income taxation, because 
that would allow for some equality, as the ones who possess these benefits (e.g. housing and 
cars) are the richer and not the poor. 
2.2.4 Flexibility 
The concept of flexibility implies that it should be possible to adjust tax changes to economic 
circumstances to facilitate macroeconomic stability and economic development (Black, Calitz 
& Steenekamp, 2005, p.122). Economic performance in general is characterized by 
recessions, booms, as well as by structural changes and taxes should have enough flexibility 
to accommodate these changes (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.147). 
Flexibility can be addressed both from the supply or the demand side (Black, Calitz & 
Steenekamp, 2005, p.147). Taxes can influence economic activity from the supply side 
through, for example, the impact on the supply of work effort or on the incentive to save. For 
example, should the wage elasticity of supply of female workers be higher than that of males, 
it would imply that females should be taxed at lower MTRs to encourage them to participate 
in the labour market. 
On the demand side, stabilization policy can be used to smooth out business cycles. 
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Black et al. (2011, p.289) state that “Keynesian economists and policy makers also believed 
that income taxes and unemployment benefits strengthen the demand-stabilizing impact of 
active fiscal policy”. Automatic stabilizers, referring to income tax and unemployment 
benefits, are fiscal policies that are inherent in the law, because they do not require new 
legislation since the economic conditions generate changes in the government revenue and 
expenditure without any deliberate government action (Swanepoel & Schoeman, 2002, 
p.568). A good example of such policy is progressive income taxation that acts as a built-in 
or automatic stabilizer. With automatic stabilizers, when there is a recession the average 
income tax rate will automatically begin to decrease and the opposite is true in the case of an 
economic boom. 
An important factor that poses difficulties in flexibility is that governments may face political 
difficulty in adjusting the tax rates (Stiglitz, 2000, p.466). Depending on the complexity of 
the tax system and rates much political debate is generated on deciding which rates to adjust 
and how tax payers are to bear the burden of an increase in the tax rates. 
The speed of adjustment is also a very important aspect of flexibility when it comes to 
stabilizing the economy (Stiglitz, 2000, p.466). When the lags in the economy are too long, it 
can happen that by the time the increase in the tax rate is taking place, the economy might 
just be in need of a tax reduction or vice versa. Swanepoel and Schoeman (2002, p.569) 
explained that economic adjustments and their effects are exposed to variable and irregular 
time lags, making it hard to calculate the actual size of the yearly budget deficit. 
What developing countries need is to facilitate trade and enhance the supply response to 
remove barriers to trade (Morrissey, 2005, p.1135). Increasing exports is not enough as 
exports will increase the inflows of foreign exchange which could appreciate the exchange 
rate and be bad for international trade. In addition, increases in exports should be 
accompanied by increases in demand for imports (Morrissey, 2005, p.1137); this way the 
economy becomes more flexible or responsive to shocks. 
2.2.5 Political Responsibility 
According to Stiglitz (2000, p.467), the norm of political responsibility entails that the tax 
system must be transparent and come about as a result of legislation. In other words, the 
burden of payment should be clear to the tax payer and the one who benefits should also be 
clearly identified. Sometimes governments purposefully tend to misrepresent the true costs of 
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the services provided by the state. It should be clear if a tax is to be fully borne by the 
employee or the employers. Governments intentionally convince individuals to believe that 
the costs of government services are less than expected, so as not to shake public confidence 
and lower public morale. Stiglitz (2000, p.467) adds that corporation taxes are the least 
politically responsible because who really pays the tax is not apparent as taxes are paid by the 
people, not institutions. 
Second, Stiglitz (2000, p.468) adds that a politically responsible tax should be one where 
changes to taxes come about as result of law changes and the tax changes should be evaluated 
afterwards by the citizens, to decide whether the government is spending too much or too 
little. Bird (2007, p.58) suggested that governments need to play “the right game”, which 
conforms to Stiglitz’s notion of political responsibility. Before a country can implement 
major changes in its tax system, it needs to apply major changes in its economic and/or 
political reality. During “stable” periods in the economy a good tax reform could act like a 
good seat belt law, in that ceteris paribus, the tax ratio will just continue to increase (lives 
will be saved). However in case of administrative downfalls, or any relevant shocks, the tax 
ratios will not be very responsive, because they are not shaken as they have a “safety belt 
on”. This great analogy by Bird (2007, p.58) shows that countries will achieve equilibrium 
according to the nature and size of their fiscal system which reflects the balance between 
their political strength and institutions, until they are shocked into a new equilibrium. This 
could be due to supply factors which change over time as a means to counteract all the 
attempts to raising the tax ratios, or because the perception of what is an optimal tax level 
may change over time, which is most probable. 
2.2.6 Institutionalisation of tax reforms 
Bird (2007, p.56) furthermore suggests that tax reforms should be institutionalised. Many 
reforms are focused on what to consider instead of how to proceed. Paying attention to the 
institutional arrangements in place before applying reforms, will improve the quality of the 
reforms, as well as increase the probability of their successful adoption and implementation. 
Bird (2007) gives four reasons for institutionalisation. First, better planning leads to better 
packaging, which weakens political opposition and attracts more political support. Second, in 
this way changes in the proposals can be made faster, while maintaining the core objective of 
the reform. Third, arguments which are politically appealing but incorrect can be rebutted if 
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supported by accurate studies. Last, it allows politicians to have better timing and 
presentation control of the process. 
2.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON TAX POLICY IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
This section focuses on empirical evidence of tax reforms in developing countries. First, the 
aim is to give a descriptive overview of special features of tax systems in developing 
countries. It is important to point out that these recent changes being implemented in 
developing countries are the same ones being implemented in developed countries. This is 
besides there being significant differences in their cultural, political and economic 
background. This section also discusses factors that determine tax changes in developing 
countries in general. 
2.3.1 Special Features and Constraints of Tax Systems and Administration 
Developed countries differ from developing countries in multiple tax-relevant ways, for 
example, the size of the formal sector, administrative capacity, the standard type of 
businesses and levels of income per capita income, amongst others (Heady, 2002, p.1). 
Complex administration and weak capacity 
Tax offices in developing countries often lack administrative capacity and administrative 
procedures such as reporting tax revenues, which are poorly monitored partly because the tax 
officials lack the necessary training (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.146). This is the 
case in many sub-Saharan African countries. Despite recent tax reforms, it is still evident that 
tax systems in developing countries remain complex, lack transparency and have too many 
rate structures which make it hard for taxpayers to comprehend (Fjeldstad & Rakner, 2003, 
p.29). Tax laws are written in a complex way and there are hardly any manuals of instruction 
for taxpayers. In addition, the sanctions available for non-compliance to the tax laws are often 
weak (Ahmad & Stern, 1989, p.1030). As a result, the tax system becomes costly to 
administer and the complexity creates loopholes for corruption and mismanagement. 
According to the World Bank chief, Jim Yong Kim, corruption is the biggest problem faced 
by developing countries (Economic Times, 2013). Government regulation is set in a way that 
does not allow prices to be flexible (Jerome & Ogunkola, 2000, p.11). As a result, the citizens 
tend to create a secondary economy, which is more responsive to changes in the economy. 
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This economy is also known as the black or informal market and can be as big as the formal 
economy, or even bigger (Killick, 1993, p.11). This illustrates a paradox: these economies are 
inflexible but the citizens are rapidly able to adapt to changes in a very resourceful and 
entrepreneurial way by resorting to the informal sector. The problem is that these people who 
are rapidly responsive are in the informal market, and have economic restraints in a way that 
the fruits of all their efforts do not result in a flexible national economy (Killick; 1993, p.11). 
The question of proper tax administration in developing countries becomes even more 
delicate when dealing with small businesses, for two reasons. First, because their potential 
contribution, together with medium-sized businesses, can represent up to a quarter of total 
revenue (Shome, 2004, p.4). Considering that only a small part of this revenue is actually 
collected in developing countries, it is important that potential revenue is strictly targeted to 
maximize revenue collection. 
Low levels of per capita income 
According to Fjeldstad and Rakner (2003, p.1) developing countries face the following 
dilemmas relevant to tax policy: first, there is an urgent need to generate more revenue to 
sustain the delivery of public services. Second, those with economic ability to pay tax are few 
and often evade and avoid taxes. Third, those who do not pay and who are unable to pay tax 
are many and often resist the tax system as whole. Tanzi and Howell (2000, p.308) confirmed 
this and mentioned that personal income has yielded little revenue for developing countries 
because the number of citizens subject to this tax is small and the group that is subject to the 
higher MTRs is even smaller. 
Considering the income disparities faced by developing countries, this creates tremendous 
pressure on the individuals who are on the tax base. This causes redistribution to be rather 
ineffective. With regards to exemptions in personal incomes for the sake of redistribution and 
administration, Ahmad and Stern (1989, p.1065) argue that low exemption levels might bring 
more taxpayers into the tax net than is possibly manageable by the authorities. On the other 
side, high levels of exemption will cause government to lose revenue and will probably be 
perceived as unfair by the population. According to Ahmad and Stern (1989, p.1065) this is 
the trend many developing countries erroneously like to follow and should only be 
permissible if administrative resources are scarce. As long as exemptions increase slower 
than Gross National Products per capita, a greater part of the population will be brought into 
the income tax net, and this will work in favour of a growing role of personal income tax. 
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Special treatment of small businesses 
Small- and medium-sized businesses play an important role in developing countries to 
stimulate economic growth and create jobs. According to Black et al. (2011, p.223) “It is also 
recognised, however, that the tax system severely affects this type of business in so far as tax 
compliance is concerned”. In many developing countries policy makers try to provide some 
assistance for small business through the tax system, such as allowing certain tax incentives, 
or special depreciation allowances, or to tax these enterprises on a cash flow basis. One of the 
economic constraints for developing countries in Africa is that tax bases are too small, 
implying that there are limited ways to increase revenue through taxation. For this reason 
priority is given to the more favourable tax treatment of small- and medium enterprises. 
Informal sector activity 
It became clear that many normal economic activities which should be measured and taxed 
were taking place in informal economies (Tanzi, 1999, p.338). In countries where tax 
administration is a problem, monitoring these can be close to impossible. The activities of 
economic agents in this sector of the economy escape the attention of public officials, i.e. 
regulatory or tax authorities, and all informal activities are thus not captured in the official 
statistics. The greater the potential tax liability, the greater the distortion between gross and 
net earnings, resulting in a greater incentive for individuals to participate in the informal 
economy. 
On the other hand, in developing countries, where unemployment is often rife, informal 
activity is often a survivalist strategy. Due to globalisation and trade liberalisation, domestic 
firms in many developing countries are unable to compete with the multinational corporations 
which have entered their markets. Loopholes in tax administration have also allowed for the 
growth or at least not enforced the eradication of the informal sector (Tanzi & Zee, 2000, 
p.300) and consequently the tax gap. Moreover, although high tax rates are a very important 
reason for the existence of the informal sector, it is not the main reason (Ahmad & Stern, 
1989, p.1035). Overlaps exist between criminal activities and tax evasion. This is to say that a 
decrease in the tax rates is unlikely to eradicate the informal sector because it involves a 
heavy cycle of drug addictions, substance abuse and illicit trades in the market by very 
powerful groups like the mafia. In addition, developing countries tend to have a considerable 
amount of other informal sector activities that are difficult to monitor and tax, such as small 
scale farming and household production in agriculture (Ahmad & Stern, 1989, p.1035). 
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2.3.2 Factors Determining Tax Changes in Developing Countries 
Apart from these special features, there are three specific factors that significantly influence 
tax policy changes in developing countries: democratisation, declining aid flows and 
globalisation (Fjeldstad & Rakner, 2003, p.1). The first two factors are of particular relevance 
in the South African context. In the face of democratization, governments hoping to seek 
power based on popular consent are restricted in using their political power to impose 
taxation collection measures and regimes. Second, aid flows to developing countries are 
decreasing, leaving developing countries more dependent on their own tax revenues. Last, 
due to globalisation there is increasing integration of the world’s capital and goods markets 
(Fjeldstad & Rakner, 2003, p.1). Consequently countries have to conform to investment and 
international trade agreements. 
2.3.2.1 Democratization 
The literature indicates that a democratic transition is closely linked to an economic transition 
(Profeta, Pugliesi & Scabrosetti, 2010, p.2). The implementation of tax design and reforms 
are at the core of economic policy. This is an important factor in determining the direction of 
public policies and reforms, especially of redistribution through taxation and public spending. 
In democratic countries, tax reforms need voters’ support for their implementation. Hence, 
policymakers will always try to structure tax policies that please as many voters as possible 
(Haggard & Kaufman, 1995, p.166). These policies can push and pull the majority of interest 
groups which greatly influences the decision of which party is to stay in power according to 
the fiscal advantages the party offers, in relation to other parties (Profeta, Pugliesi & 
Scabrosetti, 2010, p.1). Economic transitions interrelate with political transitions because of 
globalisation, as well the organisation of democracy. This is because an increase in economic 
welfare alone is not enough to support and introduce a democracy. Stable democracies in turn 
gear liberalisation and economic reforms which have a positive effect on the overall 
performance of the economies (Profeta, Pugliesi & Scabrosetti, 2010, p.6). 
The main goal of taxation in a democratic economy is to raise sufficient revenue from its 
citizens, in often poor and increasingly open economies, to provide public goods and 
services. Tax decisions impact on the provision of public services as well as on the 
democracy itself. Therefore, tax systems should be designed in a way that is fair, to maximize 
the productive potential of the economy as well as the economic welfare (Mirrlees et al., 
2011, p.24). Following from this point, it is advisable that tax reforms should be risk averse 
(Diamond & Zodrow, 2008, p.175) so that revenue yields are not negatively affected and 
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undesirable inequalities do not result, because important goals of tax reforms will always be 
to enhance revenue, reduce budget deficits and reduce inequality. 
Hence, it is imperative that governments be patient and committed with tax reforms. That 
always means that they will have to use their capital, both political and financial, to bring 
about the desired changes. In certain instances the costs of the tax reform are concentrated 
among a certain group but the benefits are widespread which can create serious opposition for 
government. This means that there are high risks and costs for governments engaging in tax 
reforms. While the costs are immediate, the benefits are often only seen in the medium- to 
long-run (Fjeldstad & Rakner, 2003, p.28). Moreover, improved tax structures from tax 
reforms will not prevail unless they are properly administered, as found by Heller and Shell 
(1974, p.345). 
During a democratic transition, the influence of interest groups may interact with voters’ 
preference in determining the outcome of public policies in a more persuasive way than in 
mature economies. Therefore, transitional arrangements need to be thoroughly analyzed for 
the medium- and long-term so that businesses are encouraged and investment risks decreased. 
This should enable the government to reach the many objectives of the tax reforms required 
for a credible tax regime, and higher levels of business confidence. There should also be an 
adjustment period before reforms are implemented (Khalilzadeh-Shirazi & Shah, 1991, p.46) 
to be politically feasible, which conforms to the notion of Stiglitz (see Section 2.2.5). 
Since tax reforms take time, some governments may opt for more short-term reforms due to 
their practicality as well as for political reasons. Therefore, it is important to make sure that 
coordinated tax reforms are more consistent with the overall tax objectives than individual 
ones. They enhance overall economic performance. Individual or short-term reforms may 
increase fiscal deficits and aggravate macroeconomic imbalances. Tax reforms should be 
linked to reforms in the public sector as well as restructuring of the economy in general. In 
addition proceeds from tax reforms should not be used to finance an inefficient set of public 
expenditures (Khalilzadeh-Shirazi & Shah, 1991, p.45). 
Taxes are important tools of redistribution under a democratic regime. Democracy 
encourages redistribution from the rich to the poor through either an enlarged welfare state or 
a reformed tax system which relies more on direct taxation to bring about redistribution. Tax 
reforms also promote equality because they allow the lower income groups to partake in the 
political process, thus it should ideally lead to the design of policies that favour these groups, 
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i.e. the physically disabled, the elderly, children, the sick and the unemployed. For low levels 
of democracy
5
, public spending is high to satisfy the needs and demands for rents of the elite, 
whereas for high levels of democracy, public spending is high due to the increase in the 
demand for public goods. This shows that it is more efficient for government to function 
under democracy. In general it seems, tax systems of democracies are designed in a way that 
encourages voluntary tax compliance (Profeta, Pugliesi & Scabrosetti, 2010, p.7). 
When considering tax reforms it is important to make a thorough cost-benefit analysis of the 
revenue collection. This includes the compliance costs to tax payers as well as the direct costs 
of tax administration. Corruption and tax evasion need to be decreased as well the elimination 
of ineffective tax preferences. Although it may be a timely route, if a country is aimed 
towards simplification it will make the transition a lot smoother. However, that does not 
mean that simplification will not cause distortions in the system (Bird & Wallace, 2003, p.7). 
2.3.2.2 Declining aid flows 
Foreign aid to developing countries has been decreasing since the early 1990s. Aid to the 
developing countries, relative to donor-country GDP, had fallen from 0.35% in 1970s to 
0.25% in 1996. (O’Connel & Soludo, 1998, p.2). This has rendered it much more important 
to increase the revenue-raising capacity of tax systems in developing countries. 
However, especially in Africa, aid and aid dependency has put a stop to the development of 
tax-accountability relations between the state and its citizens (Gloppen & Rakner, 2002, p.5). 
In addition, lack of administrative capacity and transparency also add to this aid dependency. 
The presence of foreign forces and forms of capital leaves the state unaccountable towards its 
citizens. In other words, government neither requires public support, nor the assent of their 
own laws, because the revenue is not being raised from the local economy. All they need is to 
keep the donors satisfied and willing to continue to provide assistance (Gloppen & Rakner, 
2002, p.5). This has, implicitly, prevented these countries from exploring their revenue 
raising potentials. On the one hand it has been good to see African countries trying to sustain 
themselves. On the other hand, the years of aid have left many African countries unable to 
sustain themselves, both politically and economically. The effect is that when they are unable 
to find financial autonomy conflicts are generated. 
                                                 
5 Low levels of democracies are characterised by social movements, interest group activities and political party 
mobilization, low levels of political violence and less or ineffective state monitoring and has a high involvement 
in semi-legal and illegal actors in public politics (Tilly, 2007, p.20) 
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2.3.2.3 Globalisation 
Globalisation is the binding of different national economies into a single world economy due 
to increasing trade, investment and financial flows, rapid transfers of technology and greater 
labour mobility (Ouattara, 1997, p.107). In other words, business and individuals have greater 
freedom to take advantage of economic opportunities abroad, thus increasing the sensitivity 
of investment and local taxation decisions.
6 
This creates a pressure in countries to reduce the 
tax rates to avoid pushing away the tax payers, which in turn increases international tax 
competition. 
Loss of Fiscal Autonomy 
Due to globalisation, countries have been forced to revise their tax structures, their 
administration and compliance. They have had to be more sensitive to changes in tax policy 
of their competitors and trading partners. As a result, countries are losing their fiscal 
autonomy regarding tax policies. Asher and Rajan, (1999, p.5) referring to Musgrave (1959) 
noted that globalisation reinforces two important rules of conventional wisdom. First, income 
taxes should not be higher in countries that import capital, than in countries that export 
capital. Second, that corporate income tax must not be lower than the highest rate of 
individual income tax. One of the possible theoretical solutions is harmonizing the tax base 
for individuals and businesses. 
Tax Competition 
Globalisation creates international pressure to compete for and attract foreign investment, as 
well as for the purchasing power of neighbouring consumers due to the increased mobility of 
labour and capital, but often at the cost of pursuing more essential tax reforms (Tanzi & 
Howell, 2000, p.319). Actually, many countries have pursued tax reforms with the intent of 
attracting foreign investment as a means of increasing the tax base and consequently tax 
revenue. This competitive international environment has made countries adopt defensive 
policies to prevent resident tax payers from enjoying lower tax rates abroad. Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) is important for overall economic growth, by increasing revenue potential 
with the creation of jobs and increasing both corporate and personal income tax revenue, 
                                                 
6
 For example recent fuel, food and commodity shocks as well as the global financial crisis in 2008, seriously 
affected economic growth in African developing countries, particularly because it happened at a time when 
many African economies were starting to see results from economic and political reforms. The financial crisis 
caused falling commodity prices and export revenues, and declining capital flows, seriously affecting tax 
revenue (Almquist, 2009, p.22). 
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among others. For this reason, countries compete with each other by offering the more 
attractive tax rates, various types of tax incentives as well as other fiscal and non-fiscal 
allowances (Asher & Rajan, 1999, p.10). 
In the global economy with capital mobility, tax structures are moving away from a 
dependence on corporation income tax, due to capital being able to move more freely 
between countries. In the face of globalisation, the factors of production migrate to the 
countries were the taxes are lower. Therefore, the countries start competing with lower tax 
rates and decreased capital taxes. The literature on tax competition shows that globalisation is 
negatively related to capital taxation (Profeta, 2003, p.17). Developing countries are now 
seeking to draw foreign direct investment and for these reasons the income tax rates for 
corporations and persons have been significantly decreased over the world, consequently, 
leading to decreases in revenues, in government’s capacity to redistribute and a decline in 
expenditures (Dreher, 2003, p.5). 
Tax harmonisation 
A response to tax competition includes tax harmonisation between countries, hence 
restricting countries from offering tax rates that are too generous to inflows of foreign 
investments. These tax responses are far from realistic because they do not promote economic 
growth or to reform inefficient tax systems. They should instead adopt pro-growth tax 
policies by learning from tax policies in other countries (Edwards, 2010, p.37). This has led 
to the harmonisation of the tax rates and the tax bases. In Southern Africa Botswana, Lesotho, 
South Africa and Namibia (BLSN) have been integrated for years both historically and by 
agreement. There is a Southern African Customs Union (SACU) agreement that allows for 
goods to be exchanged between the BLSN countries with a common external and excise tariff 
and the revenue is shared among the member countries (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, 
p.151). 
Nowadays, finance and services are among the fastest growing areas of foreign investment, 
as well as intangibles like trademarks, knowledge and patents, whose profits can easily be 
moved to low-tax countries. For these reasons among many others, many industries have 
become rather sensitive to tax rates today and so is foreign direct investment. As a 
consequence of globalisation tax treaties have been created between countries to harmonise 
taxes, prevent fiscal evasion and avoid double taxation (OECD, 2001, p.5). This has 
strengthened the economic relations between countries by promoting cooperation between tax 
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authorities. In addition, tax treaties have improved the tax consequences of foreign 
investment. 
Lower trade and excise taxes 
In general developing countries are highly reliant on trade taxes for revenue purposes. 
However, trade taxes create economic distortions and thus increase economic inefficiency 
and excess burden. The distortionary impact is evident from the positive growth experience 
of the countries which have become open to international trade (Heady, 2002, p.4). 
However, there has been a decrease in trade taxes all over the world. The argument for the 
reduction is that imposing trade taxes on narrow bases of developing countries can cause 
revenue shortfalls if the base does not grow as fast as the economy. This has been due to 
developing countries’ desire to be a part of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Tanzi & 
Zee, 2000, p.307). The WTO is of the opinion that because trade taxes are inefficient, they 
should be reduced and eventually eliminated to make the tax systems more efficient (Emran 
& Stiglitz, 2005, p.619). Most developing countries reacted to this reduction in revenue from 
trade taxes by increasing consumption taxes such as VAT which is more efficient. According 
to Black et al. (2011, p.270) developing countries still rely on trade taxes for 21.1% of their 
tax revenue.
7
 
Furthermore, the increase in cross-border shopping, phone or mail order and internet 
shopping, have led to the imposition of ceilings on excise and sales taxes (Asher & Rajan, 
1999, p.21). 
Introduction of Value Added Tax 
Currently developing countries rely particularly on VAT for much of their tax revenue (Black 
et al., 2011, p.270). The imposition of VAT is an effective way to compensate for the 
revenue loss from reduction in trade taxes and as a substitute for commodity taxes. First, 
because it broadens the tax base, reduces distortions in relative prices and allows the 
economy to grow in line with GDP, and enhances international competitiveness as it can be 
completely removed from exports (Heady, 2002, p.5). Second, because it encourages 
                                                 
7
 This is in contrast to developed countries, where trade taxes only make up 0.8 % of tax revenue (Black et al., 
2011, p.270). 
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compliance as it is self-enforceable. Last, it ends the cascading effect involved in turnover 
taxes and manufacture’s sales tax systems. 
Disadvantages include the fact that it is a difficult tax to administer and it can be regressive if 
applied at a single rate (Heady, 2002, p.6). According to Heady (2002, p.5) indirect taxes in 
developing countries have a tendency to be regressive with regards to income. But if the 
objects of indirect taxation are carefully selected then it can lead to a more progressive, or at 
least, proportional distribution, with respect to income (Ahmad & Stern, 1989, p.1021). 
However, expenditure on business inputs should not be subject to taxation; this is possible 
with VAT because the traders are allowed to claim back the VAT charged to them on their 
inputs (Mirrlees et al., 2011, p.5). This way zero rates and tax exemptions are avoided, as 
they disable the deduction of input costs, even though these are the current tendencies with 
VAT (Bahl & Bird, 2008, p.14). 
2.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter first discussed the conventional norms to which tax systems should comply. It 
explained the meaning of administrative efficiency, which is important for collecting 
maximum revenue, and of economic efficiency, which requires that taxes should distort the 
decisions of economic participants as little as possible. It also explained the importance of 
politically responsible tax reforms in order for the reforms to be accepted by the taxpayers. 
The second part of this chapter focused on tax policy in developing countries and highlights 
special features of developing countries that are important for tax policy. These are the weak 
administrative capacities, low per capita incomes, special treatment of small business and the 
existence of informal sectors. It also discussed democratisation, declining aid flows and 
globalisation as three factors that also influenced tax changes in developing countries. 
Globalisation is particularly relevant in the South African context. It explained that 
globalisation has lead to tax competition between countries which encouraged tax 
harmonisation and the signing of tax treaties as well as a general decrease in tax rates on 
income all over the world. Because of WTO rules trade taxes have also been reduced and 
many countries introduced VAT to compensate for the revenue loss. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
AN ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF THE CHANGES TO THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN TAX STRUCTURE SINCE THE 1990s 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Section 1.1 the changes to the South African tax system since the 1990s 
occurred during two phases: the first phase covers the period between the Margo (1987) and 
the Katz Commissions (1994–1999) and the second phase the period after Katz to 2010. First 
this chapter gives a descriptive overview of some of the specific changes to the South African 
tax system, explaining the rationale in terms of the theoretical framework, as well as some 
evidence from developing countries. The second part of the chapter tries to answer the 
question of whether the intended objectives with the specific changes were achieved. 
3.2 CHANGES TO THE TAX SYSTEM: 1990 - 2010 
3.2.1 Phase One: 1987 - 1994 
The Margo Commission was appointed in 1987 (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.154). 
As mentioned earlier in Section 1.1 this was a difficult period in the economic history of 
South Africa, which caused major fiscal challenges. The intention with the appointment with 
this commission was to restructure the existing tax structure by focusing on broadening the 
tax base. The reforms aimed at creating jobs, reducing the brain-drain, improving tax 
compliance and morality, encouraging capital formation, encouraging immigration, and 
promoting entrepreneurship (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.154). 
The following sections give an overview of the most important changes to the South African 
tax system, as well as the economic rationale behind, during this period.  
3.2.1.1 Income taxation 
a) Personal Income Tax 
The individual became the standard unit of taxation which allowed for the equal treatment of 
both genders and enhances tax neutrality (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.155). To 
women it was very important that the unit of taxation be changed from the couple to the 
individual. Previously, married women faced higher MTRs in comparison to married men 
and unmarried persons. This was discrimination against women which negatively affected the 
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neutrality of the tax and therefore distorted women’s choice to work after marriage. This was 
based on the assumptions that married couples enjoyed economies of scale
8
 (Budlender, 
Casale & Valodia. 2010, p. 211), married women’s salary would be an extra to the household 
and consequently could be taxed at a higher rate and that married couples would share their 
incomes; hence, the married women’s high MTRs would be offset by the husband’s low 
income tax rate. This meant that the tax burden on married women was higher than on other 
taxpayers. 
The Commission recommended that the income tax should have fewer and broader brackets 
and lower MTRs (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.154). This was \o make the income 
tax structure simpler and to facilitate its administration. 
Top marginal rates were set at 45% in fiscal year 1987/88 from 50% in 1986/87 and 
decreased to 43% in 1991/92; the number of tax brackets were as many as 19 in fiscal 
1988/89 and decreased to only 9 in fiscal year 1992/93. 
Fringe benefits provided by employers, such as housing and housing assistance schemes, 
travel allowances and rental of movable and immovable property, became taxable in 1985 
(Republic of South Africa, 1985, p. 3). They were often partially exempt from tax as a way of 
compensating for the high MTRs on personal income (Steenekamp, 2012b, p.13). Bringing 
fringe benefits into the tax net was thus aimed at greater economic efficiency as it eliminated 
unnecessary distortions that also created loopholes for tax evasion. The impact on income 
distribution would also have been positive, as lower categories of salary earners generally do 
not receive fringe benefits. 
The Margo Commission also recommended that the tax system should not be made more 
progressive to enhance its impact on the redistribution of income. This was because of the 
changed distribution of benefits in government expenditure: government was to spend more 
on previously disadvantaged blacks and less on whites. It is generally accepted that the 
expenditure side of the budget is a more efficient tool for redistribution. Blacks were to 
receive greater levels of service and whites were going to spend more for education, health 
and other public services for this redistributive purpose. For this reason the change in this 
                                                 
8
 Married couples would enjoy economies of scale in that because they live together, they would pay only one 
rent and their living costs would shared, and so would be cheaper than for a person living alone. 
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distribution of benefits and costs had to be accompanied by a shift in the tax burden 
(McGrath, 1991, p.17). 
b) Company Income Tax 
A secondary tax on companies (STC) was introduced in 1993 (Koch, Schoeman & Van 
Tonder, 2005, p.194) as a tax on distributed profits. It was introduced to encourage firms to 
re-invest their profits and consequently promote economic growth. It was also a way to re-
introduce taxation of dividends which had been exempted in 1990 (Black, Calitz & 
Steenekamp, 2005, p.155). The taxation of dividends had been abolished because it created 
distortions of the return on debt and equity funding and in the selection of the form of 
business organisation. Moreover, nothing prohibited companies from passing on profits from 
one company to another as dividends, and the undistributed profits tax could only be levied 
on undistributed dividend income (Lombard, 1996, p.36). 
The reduction in company tax rates
9
 are reflected on the table below: 
Table 3.1 Rate of Nominal Tax on Companies, 1990 - 1994 
Year of 
Assessment 
Flat rate on 
taxable 
income 
% 
Rate of STC 
1989/90 50 - 
1990/91 50 - 
1991/92 48 - 
1992/93 48 - 
1993/94 40 15 
1994/95 35 25 
Source: Adapted from Adapted from SARB (2012, p.90) 
Company tax rates were reduced from 50% in fiscal 1990/91 to 40% in fiscal 1993/94, the 
year of the establishment of the new democratic government in South Africa. In addition, the 
flat rate of company tax was reduced to 35% in 1994/95, to mitigate the introduction of the 
STC, because the introduction of STC increased the effective tax rate on companies (Koch, 
Schoeman & Van Tonder, 2005, p.194). This meant that the STC decreased the 
                                                 
9
 Company tax rates exclude the mining sector 
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competitiveness of South African companies, which in turn was not good for attracting 
foreign investment. 
The reduction in nominal tax rates in 1994 was implemented to reduce the burden of the 
combined corporate tax rates as well distorting effects of the STC (Katz Commission, 1996, 
p.22). This was very important, given the demands of the new democracy and the urgency of 
attracting foreign direct investment in order to grow the economy. In addition, because of 
globalisation businesses had greater freedom to take advantages of investment opportunities 
abroad, leaving it sensitive to tax rates. South Africa was forced to reduce its nominal tax 
rates to avoid pushing away investments and skilled labour. 
c) Capital gains tax (CGT) 
The possible introduction of a CGT had been investigated, but rejected, by the Margo 
Commission. The commission was against any form of wealth taxation as it could distort 
investment away from productive assets (McGrath, 1991, p.17). This explanation is 
interesting as the Commission referred to CGT as a tax on wealth, whereas it is generally 
treated as an income tax. A capital gain, just as a salary, forms part of the comprehensive 
income base, or the Haig Simons’ definition of income (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, 
p.158). 
3.2.1.2 Indirect taxes 
a) Value Added Tax 
VAT was introduced in 1991 to replace the General Sales Tax (GST) (Black, Calitz & 
Steenekamp, 2005, p.205). It was initially levied at 10% and the rate was increased to 14% in 
April 1993 (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, p.205). 
VAT was introduced, first, to minimize tax evasion because it covers a broader tax base and 
eradicated the cascading tax effect inherent in the GST (Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2005, 
p.154). The cascading effect occurred because the tax was levied on the purchase of inputs 
and ultimately on the value of the sales which is the output (United States. Congressional 
Budget Office, 1992, p.26). It was levied on a significantly broad base, including on all 
registered vendors of goods, with the exemption of financial services, education, non-
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governmental organisations and health services. It was also subject to zero-ratings and 
exemptions in some instances.
10
. 
As VAT is levied at every stage of production and accumulates, it is comparable to a tax on 
all final household consumption (Tait, 1999, p.494). According to Keen (2006, p.4) because 
VAT is charged and/or refunded at all stages of production it does not distort the input prices 
of business, because there is no excess burden. 
b) Fuel levy 
Fuel levy in South Africa was first introduced as a GST at 4% ,or 1 cent per litre, in June 
1978 (CEEPA, 2009, p.2), but was replaced in 1987 by a fuel levy at 30 cents a litre. Because 
the GST was a tax on sales and it could negatively affect financing of the oil industry; 
therefore it was replaced by the fuel tax because this is a tax on stock and could be brought 
into account from the point of sale oil company depots (SAPIA, 2002). 
c) Capital Transfer Tax 
Capital Transfer Tax was imposed to replace estate duty and donations tax (Black, Calitz & 
Steenekamp, 2005, p.154) and was levied at a flat rate of 15% on dutiable value of deceased 
estates exceeding R250 000. Despite the fact that the Commission was against taxing any 
form of wealth, and capital transfer tax is a tax on wealth, the Commission agreed it was not 
distortive as the rate was moderate and was unlikely to affect substantially the patterns of 
investments and savings. In addition, its revenue-raising potential was low (McGrath, 1991, 
p.17). 
3.2.2 Phase Two: Katz Commission 1994- 1999 
The Katz Commission (1994–1999)11 was the first tax reform investigation in the post-
apartheid period under the new democratic government (Manuel, 2002, p.4). South Africa 
was accepted into the world economy again and the period of trade and financial sanctions 
came to an end, but the integration into the world economy brought its own challenges. As 
discussed in Section 2.3.1 many developing countries make changes to their tax structures 
                                                 
10
 Certain commodities that are highly consumed by low-income households are zero-rated. Basic food items 
like pilchards, brown bread, dried beans, samp, vegetable oil, maize meal, lentils, mealie rice, dried mealies, 
milk powder, unprocessed vegetables and fruit, rice and eggs were exempted from VAT in 1991(Cnossen 2003, 
p.6). 
11
 Between 1994 and 1999, nine interim reports were issued (South Africa. National Treasury, 2000, p.3) 
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following the establishment of new democratic governments, because of declining aid flows 
and because of the demands of globalisation. 
The main aims of the Katz Commission at the time were to improve tax collection and 
administration; improve the neutrality of the tax base; reduce government borrowing; close 
loopholes in the tax system; and re-evaluate equity aspects of many taxes (Koch, Schoeman 
& Van Tonder, 2005, p.194). The Katz Commission in general aimed to maximize equity, 
flexibility, efficiency and simplicity of the South African tax system (Katz Commission, 
1996, p.2). 
The following sub-sections present an overview of the main changes to the South African tax 
system during the second phase. 
3.2.2.1 South African Revenue Services 
A very significant institutional change was the establishment of the South African Revenue 
Service (SARS) on 18
th
 October 1995 as an autonomous agency responsible for revenue 
collection and administration (South Africa. National Treasury, 1996, p.8). SARS was a 
merger between the previous departments of Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise, 
created to increase the efficiency of the tax administration (SARB, 2013, p.5). Previously, 
both the Departments of Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise showed a continuous 
decline in their efficiency and the departments were, in addition faced with a loss of skilled 
personnel (Katz Commission, 1996, p.6). As a consequence, effective tax collection and 
administration of customs regulations declined significantly, lowering the morale of 
taxpayers. Establishing SARS was an important measure as efficient revenue collection was 
an important priority of the new democratic government, given the pressure to increase 
revenue in order to attend to the needs of the previously disenfranchised population, and to 
deliver on pre-election promises. 
The main objectives of SARS were to collect all national taxes, levies and duties efficiently, 
and to attract and preserve skilled personnel by adopting organisational structures that 
enhanced efficiency, improved human resource management practices, incentive schemes 
and by making use of modern information technology (Liebenberg, 1996, p.8). As explained 
in Section 2.2.6, Bird (2007, p.56) suggests that tax reforms should be institutionalised. In 
South Africa, this was achieved with the establishment of SARS. At a practical level, SARS 
had to oversee the proper implementation of the reforms, following the recommendations of 
the Katz Commission. 
 
 
 
 
31 
3.2.2.2 Income taxes 
a) Personal Income Tax 
Following international practice, there was a gradual decrease in MTRs on personal income 
in South Africa. This was in line with the gradual global decrease in MTRs on individuals’ 
income. As discussed in Section 2.3.2.3 this was caused by tax competition between 
countries due to globalisation. Especially in the case of South Africa as a developing country, 
it was important to consider the impact of relatively high tax rates on ‘brain drain’. 
Furthermore, the theoretical excess burden is also expected to decrease more than 
proportional to the decrease in the tax rates. 
The decrease in MTRs is reflected in the table below: 
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Table 3.2 Marginal Tax Rates in South Africa, 1990/91 - 2009/10 
Fiscal Year 
1990/9
1 
1991/9
2 
1992/9
3 
1993/9
4 
1994/9
5 
1995/9
6 
1996/9
7 
1997/9
8 
1998/9
9 
1999/0
0 
2000/0
1 
2001/0
2 
2002/0
3 
2003/0
4 
2004/0
5 
2005/0
6 
2006/0
7 
2007/0
8 
2008/0
9 
2009/1
0 
Lowest Marginal 
Tax Rate 
15% 14% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 19% 19% 19% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18% 
Values in 
Rands 
  
1-
4,000 
1-
5,000 
1-
5,000 
1-
5,000 
1-
5,000 
1-
5,000 
1-
15,000 
1-
30,000 
1-
31,000 
1-
33,000 
1-
35,000 
1-
38,000 
1-
40,000 
1-
70,000 
1-
74,000 
1-
80,000 
1-
100,00
0 
1-
112,50
0 
1-
122,00
0 
1-
132,00
0 
Highest Marginal 
Tax Rate 
44% 43% 43% 43% 43% 45% 45% 45% 45% 45% 42% 42% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 
Values in 
Rands 
  
56,001 
& 
above 
56,001 
& 
above 
56,001 
& 
above 
56,001 
& 
above 
56,001 
& 
above 
80,000
1 & 
above 
100,00
1 & 
above 
100,00
1 & 
above 
120,00
1 & 
above 
120,00
1 & 
above 
200,00
1 & 
above 
215,00
1 & 
above 
240,00
1 & 
above 
255,00
1 & 
above 
270,00
1 & 
above 
300,00
1 & 
above 
400,00
1 & 
above 
450,00
0 & 
above 
490,00
1 & 
above 
525,00
1 & 
above 
Tax 
Threshol
d 
Belo
w 65 
Yrs 
10,285 10,357 10,714 10,714 10,714 14,600 15,800 16,921 18,500 19,526 21,111 23,000 27,000 32,222 35,000 40,000 43,000 46,000 54,200 57,000 
  
65 
Yrs 
& 
Abov
e 
10,857 10,929 11,285 11285 21,429 26,785 27,905 30,050 31,950 33,717 36,538 39,154 42,640 50,000 60,000 65,000 69,000 74,000 84,200 88,528 
Source: Adapted from SARS, (2012, p.12-22) and Tomasek (2007) 
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In 1995/96 the highest marginal rate of 45% was set on the taxable income bracket of 
R80 000. It decreased to 42% in 2000/01 and to 40% in 2002/03. The top marginal rate 
remained at 40% until the end of the period under study, fiscal 2009/10. The lowest MTRs 
have been relatively stable throughout the years, remaining at 18% since 2000/01. 
There was a reduction in the gradation of the income tax schedule (Katz Commission, 1996, 
p.9). 
Tax brackets, standard deductions, credits and unadjusted tax rates and amounts were 
adjusted for inflation because of the fiscal drag. Tax brackets were reduced from 14 in 
1990/91 to 8 in 1995/96 to 6 in 1997/98 (South Africa. National Treasury, 1998, p.12). 
What happened was that after completion of the Katz Commission some individuals quickly 
progressed into the higher income tax brackets. As a consequence nominal salaries were 
inflated because the tax brackets were not indexed for inflation. This adjustment allowed for 
the decrease in the number of tax brackets. 
The tax threshold was raised, removing the lower income payer from the tax register, to 
promote progressivity and simplify administration. Progressivity was promoted because the 
higher income earning groups paid more taxes and the really low income groups paid no tax. 
Administration would be simplified because taxes need not be deducted for a large group of 
low-income earners. The minimum tax threshold for persons under the age of 65 increased 
from R10 285 in 1990/91 to R57 000 in 2009/10. The threshold at which personal income 
became taxable increased, providing more protection to low-income earners and reducing the 
entry barriers into the formal labour market. It also reduced the burden on low-income 
earners. 
PIT has undergone significant changes to enforce compliance on a broader tax base. In 1996, 
all tax schedules were comprised into two groups: a schedule for natural persons, including 
all individuals single or married, and a schedule for unnatural persons such as companies 
(Nyamongo & Schoeman, 2007, p.480). 
From fiscal year 200/01 taxes were higher on unnatural persons than on individuals. Before 
that, taxes were lower for companies than on natural persons and consequently professionals, 
like lawyers and accountants among others, were able to escape the higher marginal rates of 
PIT by opening their own business and paying the lower CIT rates. They would draw off 
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their profits through expense deductions over time and escape chronically high PIT rates. 
These changes are shown in the table below: 
Table 3.3 Comparing top Marginal tax and Company tax rates, 1990 - 2010 
Year of 
Assessment 
Company 
income 
tax % 
Rate of 
STC 
Top Marginal 
Tax Rate on 
Personal 
Income 
1990/91 50 - 44 
1991/92 48 - 43 
1992/93 48 - 43 
1993/94 40 15 43 
1994/95 35 25 43 
1995/96 35 25 45 
1996/97 35 12.5 45 
1997/98 35 12.5 45 
1998/99 35 12.5 45 
1999/00 30 12.5 45 
2000/01 30 12.5 42 
2001/02 30 12.5 42 
2002/03 30 12.5 40 
2003/04 30 12.5 40 
2004/05 30 12.5 40 
2005/06 29 12.5 40 
2006/07 29 12.5 40 
2007/08 29 10 40 
2008/09 28 10 40 
2009/10 28 10 40 
Source: SARS (2012, p.12-22) and SARB (2013, p.90) 
This system ended the discriminatory provisions in the income tax laws, as the top PIT rate 
became lower than the CIT rate as from fiscal 2002/03, thus allowing for greater economic 
efficiency This was also the realization of one of the conventional rules of globalisation as 
explained in section 2.3.2.3This provision meant that many professionals, like lawyers and 
accountants, who opted to open businesses to enjoy lower MTRs were no longer able to 
benefit in this way. 
The lowering of the top MTRs allowed South Africa to retain and attract more highly skilled 
professionals, given that tax burdens are an option in worker location choices (Glenday, 
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2008, p.8). This was very important in the face of international mobility of labour. Significant 
differences in rates of PIT were inducing highly skilled individuals to emmigrate to countries 
that offered lower MTRs, causing a brain drain in the country. According to Bailey (2003, 
p.235), South Africa had experienced a brain drain since before 1994, during the period of the 
Margo Commission. In South Africa the brain drain in the country was higher than actually 
measured during the period under study and slowed down in later years (Bhorat, Meyer & 
Mlatsheni, 2002, p.8).
12
 
There was also removal of detrimental tax schemes that eroded the tax base, like the use of 
untaxed fringe benefits to design remuneration packages, very common in the 1990s, which 
resulted in significant loss of tax revenue. To correct for this deficiency, fringe benefits such 
as company cars, travelling allowances, housing and holiday accommodation became fully 
taxable (Katz Commission, 1996, p. 33-34). Anti-avoidance provisions (such as verification 
of claims) were implemented from 1997 to 1999 to verify for the exploitation of travel 
allowances, company car schemes and residential accommodation for employees (Nyamongo 
& Schoeman, 2007, p. 480). This way government gradually started to eliminate special 
incentives, in order to protect the tax base by minimising distortions and to decrease the 
opportunities for tax evasion. The taxing of fringe benefits also reduced tax avoidance not 
only by the imposition of the tax itself, but also by ensuring that employers’ deductions were 
fully reflected the gross income of employees (South African National Treasury, 2010, p.15). 
The taxing of capital gains in 2001 after the Katz period,
13
 and the application of the 
residence-based principle of taxation, decreased tax avoidance because they prevented 
companies from putting extra money on stocks to benefit from no or lower tax rates. 
b) Company Income Tax 
Tax reforms in South Africa have tried to build a tax environment which is globally 
competitive and conducive to investment and economic growth because it is important that 
private investment is sustained by the tax regime (Manuel, 2002, p.4). 
                                                 
12
 Many South Africans emigrated, particularly to the UK, and brain drain was highest in 1993 (Bhorat, Meyer 
& Mlatsheni, 2002, p.25). 
13
 The Katz Commission recommended that capital gains tax should not be applied due to the lack of 
administrative capacity at the time (Katz Commission, 1996). Consequently it was only applied in 2001, by 
which time government felt that it had the necessary administrative capacity to implement the tax. 
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Nominal tax rates for companies were reduced to be in line with international practice, and 
because of increasing tax competition. As in the case of other developing countries, South 
Africa competes for foreign capital inflows. Decreasing the flat rate of CIT was done to 
improve the competitiveness of South African companies and promote foreign investments 
into the country. The lower rates would also have improved economic efficiency as lower 
taxes may decrease the level of evasion and avoidance. 
Decreases in company tax rates over the years are reflected on the table below: 
Table 3.4 Rate of Nominal Tax on Companies, 1990 - 2010 
Year of 
Assesment 
Rate of tax 
on taxable 
income 
% 
Rate of 
STC 
1995/96 35 25 
1996/97 35 12.5 
1997/98 35 12.5 
1998/99 35 12.5 
1999/00 30 12.5 
2000/01 30 12.5 
2001/02 30 12.5 
2002/03 30 12.5 
2003/04 30 12.5 
2004/05 30 12.5 
2005/06 29 12.5 
2006/07 29 12.5 
2007/08 29 10 
2008/09 28 10 
2009/10 28 10 
Source: Adapted from SARB (2012, p.90) 
In the fiscal year 1994/95 corporate rates were reduced to 35% from 40% in 1993/94 and then 
to 30% in 1999/00, to 25% in fiscal 2005/06 and eventually to 28% in fiscal 2008/09 (SARB, 
2012, p.12). Since its introduction in fiscal 1993/94 at 15%, STC was initially increased to 
25% in fiscal 1994/95 to compensate for the decrease in corporate tax rates in the same year 
(South Africa. National Treasury, 1994). The STC was notorious among companies and 
always had their disapproval (Katz Commission, 1996, p.23). STC was eventually decreased 
in fiscal 1996/97 to 12.5% and eventually to 10% in fiscal 2007/08, were it remained until 
2009/10. 
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Discussions took place around the possible elimination, or at least reduction, of the STC, to 
reduce the burden of the combined corporate tax and minimize its distortions (Katz 
Commission, 1996, p.22) which would have decreased the effective tax rate on companies. It 
was perceived as a double tax because it was levied in addition to the corporate income tax. 
The tax rates were too high, both separately and combined, in comparison to tax rates in the 
countries of South Africa’s trading partners.14 Consequently, in fiscal 1996/97 STC went 
from 25% to 12,5% and nominal tax rate on companies dropped from 35% to 30% in fiscal 
1999/00 and to 28% in 2008/09. This way the combined tax rate for companies was less 
distortive for the companies. 
Companies were so averse to the STC, that the issues around its abolition or rate reduction 
remained topical even after the years of the Katz Commission (Sanlam, 2013). In addition, 
the STC failed to get international recognition, which made the taxation system for 
companies in South Africa out of line with international practice. 
Since the establishment of the new democracy tax policy in South Africa had been shifting 
away from harmful tax practices (such as giving tax holidays and ring-fenced incentives
15
 to 
foreign companies, which were unavailable to local companies) as a way of attracting foreign 
investment (Manuel, 2002, p.8). This was in accordance with government’s plans to 
encourage investment through low tax rates instead of through selective tax incentives that 
distort the investment options, compromise the tax system’s impact on economic efficiency 
and erode the tax base. 
In 2009, the turnover tax was launched for small business with a turnover of R1 million or 
less, to simplify tax compliance and administrative burden for small businesses by reducing 
the number of returns that have to be filed (South Africa. National Treasury & SARS, 2010, 
p.11). It is levied on turnover not on profits (Cotten, 2012). It was launched as a parallel tax 
regime specifically for small businesses; interested small business could apply for it, 
otherwise the normal tax regime for normal companies was applicable. 
Qualifying small businesses that opt to adopt this regime need to give in only one final return 
and two interim returns for evaluation. This saves them a lot of time and cost in submitting 
tax returns (SouthAfrica.Info: New Tax System for Small Firms, 2009). The turnover tax was 
                                                 
14
 See Table 3.7 for a comparison of rates of company tax. 
15
 Ring–fenced incentives are those where residents are prevented from benefiting, or non-residents may not 
access the domestic market (Weiner & Ault, 1998, p.604). 
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not designed as a relief, but merely as a measure to cut down on red tape and compliance 
costs
16
, boosting taxpayer morale and to permit informal sector businesses that do not keep 
proper books, to also pay tax. As discussed in Section 2.3.1 informal sectors are relatively 
large in some developing countries and the sectors are particularly hard to tax (Cotten, 2012). 
Under this tax, it is easier for the government to persuade the informal business sector into 
the tax net without having to burden them with compliance costs to the value of thousands of 
Rands. 
In South Africa the tax incentives in place to attract foreign investment include incentives for 
energy efficient technologies in the form of supplementary depreciation allowances and 
incentives on natural resource sectors (South Africa. National Treasury, 2009, p.21). 
Tax incentives are used to attract foreign investment all over the world and continue to drive 
economic policy in developing and developed countries (Calitz, Wallace & Burrows, 2013, 
p.3). They work by reducing tax liability either partially (deductions, preferred rates and 
exemptions) or completely, through tax holidays. 
c) Capital Gains Tax 
CGT
17
 was introduced in 2001 (South Africa. National Treasury, 2001a, p.1). According to 
the Katz Commission (1994) CGT could not be implemented in South Africa before, due to 
lack of administrative capacity. Also the Budget Speech stated that CGT was not applied 
before 2001 because the revenue authorities lacked the necessary administrative capacity, 
given the complexity of the tax (South Africa. National Treasury, 2000, p.18). CGT is a 
complex tax and can lead to high compliance costs for taxpayers and difficulties in 
administration (South Africa. National Treasury, 2001a, p.12). This is one of the main 
arguments against the application of this tax. However, Grote and Fletcher (2005, p.344) 
argue that not taxing CGT does not make the tax system simpler. 
The main objective of CGT is to make income tax more equitable (South Africa. National 
Treasury, 2000, p.18). This is according to the principles of vertical and horizontal equity as 
discussed in Section 2.2.3. Just like any ordinary income, capital profits are economic profits 
and reflect an increase in net income (South Africa. National Treasury, 2000, p.18); therefore, 
owners of capital gains should bear the tax burden of this increase in income (Manuel, 2002, 
                                                 
16
 See section 3.3.2.4 for compliance cost for business in South Africa. 
17
 The base is the increase in value of assets such as real estate and shares (Katz Commission, 1996). 
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p.5). Following this concept, investors earning share gains must be subject to taxation, in the 
same way that employees that earn wages and salaries are subject to PIT (Manuel, 2002, p.5). 
This means that the tax should not discriminate between different types of income. CGT also 
conforms to the ability-to-pay principle which relates to vertical equity according to which 
higher incomes should be taxed differently (Grote & Fletcher, 2005, p.343). It is generally the 
relatively higher income earners that also make capital gains. 
CGT was also introduced to enhance economic efficiency by decreasing distortions in 
investment decisions. Not taxing capital gains induces taxpayers into converting ordinary 
income into tax-free capital gains, which reduces their tax burden (South Africa. National 
Treasury, 2001, p.11). 
Companies are required to pay CGT as part of CIT when they sell off assets. In order to 
maintain international competitiveness in 2010 corporate capital gains were levied at 14% 
(about half of the ordinary rate), whereas individual tax rates are based on a graduated scale 
of up to 10%, which is a quarter of the individual ordinary rate (SARS, 2010). For this same 
reason, the CGT regime introduced encompasses most of the exemptions found in 
international practice, for example exemptions for transfers between spouses, primary 
residence exemption, and exemption for involuntary disposals. 
d) Residence-based Income Tax 
South Africa started taxing its residents on a residence-base system in 2001 (Black, Calitz & 
Steenekamp, 2005, p.155). This meant that South African individuals and companies from 
that time were taxed on foreign-sourced income to the full weight of South African taxation. 
This was a consequence of globalisation. Due to globalisation there was substantial labour 
mobility and this led to loopholes in tax systems because labour mobility was not accounted 
for when the source-based system was used. Many South Africans would work abroad in 
countries like England which used the residence-based system while South Africa used the 
source-based system. These individuals working in such countries would then not be liable to 
pay personal income taxes either abroad nor in South Africa. The imposition of the residence-
based principle closed this loophole. However, non-residents are taxed only their South 
African source income (South Africa. National Treasury & SARS, 2008, p.13). 
Since the relaxing of exchange controls, South African businesses have become increasingly 
international and if the residence principle was not applied, companies and individuals would 
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operate abroad under false pretenses, just to avoid taxes (Katz Commission, 1997, p.18). 
Possible tax avoidance schemes included round-tripping schemes (RSA, 2001, p.88) in which 
taxpayers would acquire false deductions by shifting funds abroad to special purpose vehicles 
and bringing the funds back into South Africa tax-free (Manuel, 2002, p.6). This would in 
turn create equity and balance of payments concerns as it was unfair for some South Africans 
to be paying their taxes while others could avoid it and there could be significant tax revenue 
lost through these schemes. 
Through the residence-based tax regime, income from foreign subsidiaries owned by South 
Africa also forms part of the South African tax net (South Africa. National Treasury & 
SARS, 2008, p.13). The case of income from foreign subsidiaries is more intricate and needs 
to be further reviewed or else South Africans will avoid this system of taxation by investing 
in wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries. (Manuel, 2002, p.6).For these reasons, all income 
diverted abroad through tax avoidance schemes, and passive income like dividends and 
interest, are subject to tax for being owned by a South African subsidiary. 
3.2.2.3 Indirect taxes 
a) VAT 
Following the recommendations from the Katz Commission, in 1996 the VAT base definition 
was broadened to include all financial services based on a fee, with the exception of 
retirement annuity, life policy premiums, medical aid funds and contributions to pension 
funds (South Africa. National Treasury, 2011, p.10). The inclusion of financial services 
allowed for greater vertical equity because the people who make use of financial services are 
usually the ones in higher income brackets, hence, making VAT more “progressive” or at 
least relieving some of its regressivity. The change also allowed for greater economic 
efficiency because all other services were taxed with the exception of financial services. This 
created distortions in the tax system. 
The Katz Commission argued against rate differentiation to enhance the equity of the tax and 
suggested that changes regarding the increase in the standard VAT rate and narrowing of 
zero-rated items should be reviewed further (Katz Commission, 1996, p.9). During this 
period, the debate concerning zero-rating was still very much an issue, as requests for further 
zero-rating came forward from COSATU
18
 (Jansen, Stoltz & Yu, 2012, p.5). Many 
                                                 
18
 In addition to the basic foodstuffs, paraffin, an energy source used by many lower income households, was 
also exempted in 2001 (RSA, 2001, p.71). 
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governments argue that items which are predominant in low income households’ budgets, 
like food, should be zero-rated (Tait, 1999, p 495). However, the provisions for exemptions, 
exceptions, deductions and adjustments erode the VAT liability and distort economic 
efficiency of the system. These provisions result in efficiency losses in a tax of which the 
impact on economic efficiency would otherwise have been close to that of a lump-sum tax. 
Other exclusions included that small firms with a turnover of less than R300 000 per annum 
were not required to register for VAT (Go, et al., 2004, p.7), and exports. Exempt services, 
such as rental of residential properties, are also not subject to VAT. Therefore, a vendor of 
zero-rated goods and services levies output tax at zero percent (South Africa. National 
Treasury & SARS, 2012, p.128). 
b) Taxes on International Trade and Transactions 
South Africa does not make much use of the custom duties as a revenue source as its 
contribution to total revenue is rather small.
19
 The declining contribution of trade taxes to 
total tax revenue is apparent in middle-income countries all over the world (Glenday, 2008, 
p.5). In part this was due to implementation of the tariff reduction from the final act of the 
Uruguay trade negotiations in fiscal 1997/98 and the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) (SARB, 2012, p.30). 
c) Excise taxes 
Excise taxes are levies devoted to specific activities which benefit the users or members of a 
particular group (Calitz & Siebrits, 2003, p.71). Excise taxes are applied on alcohol, tobacco 
products and fuel. 
Sin Taxes: Alcohol and tobacco, also known as sin goods, are items to which excise duties 
are applied. These goods cause severe negative external effects to the public. Smoke in the air 
reduces the utility of the air to non-smokers and alcohol abuse may inflict physical and 
mental harm to third parties. The use of these sin goods also causes illnesses which increase 
rehabilitation and health provision costs to taxpayers. The use of tobacco and alcohol is also 
responsible for many road accidents and accounts for increased levels of criminal activities 
(Black & Mohamed, 2006, p.131). 
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 The revenue from international trade consists mainly of customs duties (SARB, 2012, p.30). 
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As a measure to decrease the ‘sinful’ external effects governments apply taxes on these items, 
also known as sin taxes. 
The policy decision of imposing a 50% tax burden of the retail price of tobacco products was 
imposed in 1996 (Manuel, 2002, p.10). Since then, excise tax increases have followed this 
trend. The increases are however limited due to the possible incentive to smuggle that it can 
create if prices are too high. Hence, government keeps it at a rate consistent with 
neighbouring countries (Manuel, 2002, p.10). 
Excise taxes are levied on alcoholic beverages according to the beverage’s alcohol content 
and are adjusted on an annual basis. This leaves high-alcohol beverages more heavily taxed 
than low-alcohol beverages, according to local and international practice (South Africa. 
National Treasury, 1996, p.14). This is done to combat the abuse of alcohol (South Africa. 
National Treasury, 2010, p.14) whose negative external effect is very high.
20
 This tax is 
therefore a type of Pigovian tax used to internalize the negative external impact of drinking. 
Luxury goods 
Ad valorem excises are applied in respect of luxury goods such as jewelry and sports cars. 
Taxing these goods at a higher rate enhances the progressivity of the tax system because 
those who make use of these goods are usually in the higher income groups. Thus it enhances 
the equity of the tax system. 
Fuel 
The fuel levy is currently taxed on the consumption of fuel by households and motor 
vehicles. It increases on an annual basis but the increases are below the expected inflation 
rate and linked to the high international oil prices (Manuel, 2002, p.21). In 2010, fuel taxes 
were increased to 25c/l (South Africa. National Treasury, 2010, p.14). Unlike the excise taxes 
on tobacco and alcohol, this tax was implemented to raise funds to cover the costs of road 
construction and maintenance and does not account for fuel’s environmental externalities 
(CEEPA, 2009, p.2). This means that the levy was introduced basically as a revenue-raising 
tool and not to internalize the negative externality which would have improved economic 
efficiency. 
                                                 
20
 These negative effects include drunk driving and criminal activities which may frequently result in death. 
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3.2.2.4 Tax treaties 
South Africa has treaty agreements
21
 with the United States, Australia and Mauritius among 
others to promote investment in the country through administrative cooperation and 
information exchange (Hearson, 2012). The tax treaties could be more effective but until now 
there is not much evidence to suggest that it is fruitful in attracting foreign investment into 
the country. 
3.3 ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF THE CHANGES TO THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN TAX SYSTEM BETWEEN 1990 - 2010 
The previous section focused on the most important changes to the South African tax system 
in recent years as well as the economic rationale behind them. The aim of this section is to 
investigate whether the intended objectives with these specific changes were actually 
achieved and to what extent. 
3.3.1 Revenue Raising 
3.3.1.1 Total tax revenue 
In South Africa, the level of total tax revenue has increased almost continuously after the 
establishment of SARS. The changes in total tax revenue are shown in the figure that follows: 
                                                 
21
 Tax treaties establish maximum rates of tax that can be imposed by the source country on certain categories 
of income to residents of the other country it enters into, to mitigate the effects of double taxation. 
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Fig 3.1.Total Tax Revenue in South Africa from 1994 - 2010 
 
Source: Adapted from South Africa. National Treasury & SARS (2008, p.4) and (2010, p.2)  
Note: Earlier tax statistics not available from SARS. Data is given in nominal values. 
From the above figure, it is evident that total tax revenue increased throughout up to 
2008/2009. The taxing of fringe benefits and the closing of many loopholes related to income 
taxes could have made a contribution during the first phase. Total tax revenue also grew 
faster from the time SARS was implemented until the fiscal year 2009/10. The relatively 
stronger growth in tax revenue from the year 2003/04 is clear from figure 3.1. This fast 
increase in total tax revenue occured because fiscal 2002/03 was a period of strong economic 
growth and also because major reforms were implemented, namely capital gains become 
taxable in 2001 and the source-based method of taxation was changed to residence-based. 
This stimulated strong revenue growth in the following years as is reflected in the above 
figure, and even allowed government to provide some tax relief. 
Tax collections increased on average by 13.2% between 2000 and 2008, it decreased between 
2008 and 2010 due to the economic contraction caused by the global financial crisis 
(Charalambous, 2012). The global financial crisis resulted in decreased domestic production, 
decreased demand and falling exports (SARB, 2013, p.23). 
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3.3.1.2 Components of total tax revenue 
Direct taxes 
The table below shows the contribution of income taxes to total tax revenue: 
Table 3.5 Components of total tax revenue (PIT, CIT & STC) 1994 - 2010 
  
Personal income tax 
(PIT) 
Corporate income 
tax (CIT) 
Secondary tax on 
companies (STC) 
Years 
Total tax 
Revenue 
% 
Total 
tax 
Revenue 
% 
Total 
tax 
Revenue 
% 
1994/95 44,973 40% 11,961 11% 1,304 1% 
1995/96 51,179 40% 14,059 11% 1,262 1% 
1996/97 59,520 40% 16,985 12% 1,338 1% 
1997/98 68,342 41% 19,696 12% 1,446 1% 
1998/99 77,734 42% 20,388 11% 1,931 1% 
1999/00 85,884 43% 20,972 10% 3,150 2% 
2000/01 86,478 39% 29,492 13% 4,031 2% 
2001/02 90,390 36% 42,355 17% 7,163 3% 
2002/03 94,337 33% 55,745 20% 6,326 2% 
2003/04 98,495 33% 60,881 20% 6,133 2% 
2004/05 110,982 31% 70,782 20% 7,487 2% 
2005/06 125,645 30% 86,161 21% 12,278 3% 
2006/07 140,578 28% 118,999 24% 15,291 3% 
2007/08 168,774 30% 140,120 25% 20,585 4% 
2008/09 195,115 31% 165,378 27% 20,018 3% 
2009/10 205,145 34% 134,883 23% 15,468 3% 
Source: South Africa. National Treasury & SARS (2008, p.16) and (2010, p.39). 
Note: Earlier tax statistics not available from SARS 
It is evident from the table that in comparison to CIT, PIT remained a major contributor to tax 
revenue in South Africa over the whole period. During the period of the first phase of tax 
reforms, it contributed more than 40% of total tax revenue. Interestingly enough PIT’s 
relative contribution to total tax revenue did not decrease during the financial crisis period 
2008/09. In earlier years, PIT’s contribution was higher; the decrease in its contribution to 
total tax revenue can be attributed to the lowering of the MTRs. The relative contribution of 
CIT & STC to total tax revenue has increased over the years. 
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Indirect taxes 
Table 3.6 Components of total tax revenue (VAT, Fuel, Customs & Excises) 1994 - 2010 
  VAT Fuel levy Customs 
Specific excise 
duties 
R 
million 
total tax 
Revenue 
% 
total tax 
Revenue 
% 
total tax 
Revenue 
% 
total tax 
Revenue 
% 
1994/95 29,288 26% 8,352 7% 5,606 5% 5,431 5% 
1995/96 32,768 26% 8,928 7% 6,170 5% 6,075 5% 
1996/97 35,903 24% 10,392 7% 7,201 5% 5,912 4% 
1997/98 40,096 24% 12,091 7% 5,639 3% 7,426 5% 
1998/99 43,985 24% 13,640 7% 6,053 3% 8,053 4% 
1999/00 48,377 24% 14,290 7% 6,778 3% 8,886 4% 
2000/01 54,455 25% 14,495 7% 8,227 4% 9,127 4% 
2001/02 61,057 24% 14,923 6% 8,680 3% 9,797 4% 
2002/03 70,150 25% 15,334 5% 9,620 3% 10,423 4% 
2003/04 80,682 27% 16,652 6% 8,414 3% 11,365 4% 
2004/05 98,158 28% 19,190 5% 12,888 4% 13,067 4% 
2005/06 114,352 27% 20,507 5% 18,303 4% 14,547 4% 
2006/07 134,463 27% 21,845 4% 23,697 5% 16,369 3% 
2007/08 150,443 26% 23,741 4% 26,470 5% 18,218 3% 
2008/09 154,343 25% 24,884 4% 22,751 4% 20,185 3% 
2009/10 147,941 25% 28,833 5% 19,577 3% 21,289 4% 
Source: South Africa. National Treasury & SARS (2008, p.16) and (2010, p.39).  
Note: Earlier tax statistics not available from SARS. 
It is evident from Table 3.6 that there has been a general decrease in revenue from trade taxes 
over the years. There was a slight growth in revenue from trade taxes between 1995/96 and 
1996/97 due to double digit increases in custom duties (SARB, 2013, p.30). However, from 
1997/98, the revenue from trade taxes in South Africa fell sharply following South Africa’s 
implementation of tariff reductions as agreed in the Final Act of the Uruguay Round of Trade 
Negotiations and in the Marrakesh Agreement which established the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) (SARB, 2013, p.30). 
Revenue from trade taxes increased between the periods of 2004 to 2007 due to high demand 
for imports and decreased again from 2008 to 2010 due to a drop in demand for imports 
caused by the international financial crisis in 2008 (SARB, 2013, p.30). 
Nevertheless, South Africa has been able to offset this low revenue from import duties with 
revenue from VAT (Glenday, 2008, p.5). It is evident from Table 3.6 that VAT has been 
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increasing steadily since 1994/95. It showed a decline only in 2008/09 due to the global 
financial crisis in 2008/09. 
Revenue from excises has also shown a decline from the start of the period to the end. This 
could be due to a general decrease in the consumption of tobacco products (Van Walbeeck, 
2005, p.10) or it could be a result of increased smuggling due to the increase in the excise 
rates (Van Walbeeck, 2013, p.1). 
3.3.2 Administrative Efficiency 
3.3.2.1 Contribution of SARS 
The enactment of SARS has not only set the foundation for better compliance and 
administration of tax laws and tax collection to the point of broadening the tax bases and 
improving compliance. This can be deduced from the increase in the collection of tax revenue 
over the years (Charalambous, 2012). There is however, no current public data available to 
analyse SARS’s single effect on South Africa’s revenue performance (Glenday, 2008, p.1). 
From the above, it is safe to say that the implementation of SARS has enabled the 
achievement of the revenue-raising objective of the tax reforms. SARS collected R113.8 
billion in national tax revenue in 1994/95 (nominal values) which increased to 598.705 
billion in 2009/10, a 500% increase over this period (South Africa. National Treasury & 
SARS, 2010, p.1). The Minister of Finance between 1997 and 2009, Mr. Trevor Manuel 
(2002, p.4) claimed that SARS can easily be considered the most significant contribution to 
fiscal stabilization in the country. SARS achieved significant efficiency gains during and 
after the reform years due to better compliance and administration of tax laws (SARB, 2013, 
p.24). 
Another factor that enhanced the administrative efficiency of the tax system is the 
accessibility of SARS’ services. Individuals are able to file their returns online and there are 
SARS mobile “offices” on the streets22. They provide customer assistance both online and at 
the offices. This modernization has made them more customer-friendly and has increased tax 
compliance significantly (Charalambous, 2012). 
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 The e-filing system was introduced by SARS in 2001 
 
 
 
 
48 
3.3.2.2 Evasion, avoidance and penalties 
Despite the increased administrative efficiency since the establishment of SARS, the extent 
of evasion and avoidance by individuals and companies is still very high and has become 
more sophisticated (South Africa. National Treasury, 2010, p.15). This confirms Maroun, 
Turner and Sartorius’ (2011, p.439) argument that the tighter the tax nets, the more creative 
the method of avoidance and evasion of taxes. This has become such a reality in South Africa 
that it became mandatory for all who earn an income, including the ones below the tax 
threshold, to be registered with SARS since 2010 (South Africa. National Treasury & SARS, 
2011, p.2). This way SARS can keep track on their activities in case of any tax evasion or 
avoidance. However, there are no available figures in South Africa that measures the tax gap, 
but it is estimated to be between 15% and 30% of the collected tax (Carolissen, 2010, p.9). 
Tax evasion is exacerbated also because South Africa’s income tax laws limit tax authorities’ 
discretion to publish taxpayers’ income details to safeguard the confidentiality and privacy of 
the tax payer except under specific circumstances (Phua, 2012, p.27). The penalty systems 
implemented by SARS were not effective as a deterrent for non-compliance (South African 
Government News Agency, 2009). It was so ineffective that more than 5.3 million returns 
were outstanding in fiscal 2007/08 and legal action had to be made against 81,000 taxpayers. 
In 2009 a stricter new penalty system was imposed providing for recurring penalties on a 
monthly basis each time there is an outstanding income tax return (South African 
Government News Agency, 2009). Penalties for tax evasion reinforce the cost of 
noncompliance and encourage voluntary compliance. High penalties can deter future abuses 
of the tax system (Phua, 2012, p.29). 
Also, the decrease in nominal tax rates for companies and MTRs for individuals decreased 
the opportunity and possible gains from tax arbitrage, which occurs when trading takes 
advantage of differences within or between national tax codes in order to profit (Feetham, 
2011, p.5). It can be speculated that with the closing of loopholes mentioned in Section 
3.3.1.1 narrowed the taxpayers’ opportunities for tax evasion. 
Tax amnesties
23
 were launched, including in the informal sector, to improve the informal 
sector’s contribution (Gcabo, 2007, p.357). This provision brought more taxpayers into the 
                                                 
23
 The opportunity, within a limited period, to disclose unreported information relating to previous reporting 
period, without incurring criminal charges. 
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net and improved taxpayers’ morale. The provision also brought down the extent of evasion 
and avoidance. 
3.3.2.3 Administrative costs 
A very important measure of the efficiency of tax administration is the cost of revenue 
collection, which measures the efficiency at which revenue is collected. It is measured by 
calculating the cost of internal operations as a percentage of total tax revenue and is the 
international benchmark to measure administrative efficiency. International practice states 
that ideally this ratio should be at 1% of administration costs (South Africa. National 
Treasury & SARS, 2012, p.5). 
Figure 3.2 Operating cost as a % of tax revenue 
 
Source: Adapted from South Africa. National Treasury & SARS (2008, p.28) and (2010, p.6)  
Note: Earlier tax statistics not available from SARS. 
From the figure above it is evident that cost of revenue collection has been relatively stable 
from the years 1998/99 to 2002/03. After that period it had increased to its highest ratio of 
1.23% in 2005/06. It can be speculated that this could be due to the implementation of the 
CGT in 2001 which is a rather complex tax to administer, as well as the change from source- 
to residence-based taxation in the same year. It could be that it might have taken some time 
for staff to learn to easily administer such taxes and this might have led to an increase in the 
cost of revenue collection. In the year 2009/10 the cost of revenue collection ratio increased 
to 1.2% because of the global financial crisis which lowered revenue collections without the 
possibility of a downward adjustment in cost structures within SARS (South Africa. National 
Treasury & SARS, 2012, p.5). 
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3.3.2.4 Tax compliance and taxpayer morale 
A study by Cummings et al. (2006, p.23), concluded that tax compliance in South Africa is 
relatively low. This could be because the sanctions for non-compliance are not harsh enough, 
or that the mechanisms to follow up on it are not effective, or due the social and political 
history of the country. Minister of Finance, Pravan Gordhan, claimed that SARS are now able 
to audit with accuracy as a result of improved staff and have harsher penalties for tax evasion 
schemes (South Africa. National Treasury, 2010, p.5). According to previous SARS 
Commissioner Oupa Magashule,
24
 tax compliance has increased since 1994 due to the 
increase in the number of registered tax payers which rose from 1.7 million in 1994 to 6 
million in 2010 (Charalambous, 2012). However, Mugashule noted that compliance by 
companies is low (Charalambous, 2012). 
It can be assumed that taxpayers were positively influenced by the lower tax rates and tax 
relief granted over various years and that they would be more willing to declare their personal 
income.
25
 Therefore lower tax rates would have boosted taxpayer morale and is helpful in 
reducing tax avoidance and evasion, which should result in higher levels of tax revenue. This 
is in line with Bird’s (2010, p.6) contention that tax levels should reflect the taxpayers’ 
perception of the quality and responsiveness of the state. 
3.3.3 Economic Efficiency 
Economic efficiency can be considered by looking at the various aspects of the tax reforms 
which could have impacted on the excess burden.  
3.3.3.1 Broadened tax base 
The economic efficiency of the tax system was promoted by the broadening of the tax base 
that took place during both phases of tax reforms in South Africa. During the first phase, as 
discussed in Section 3.2.1, various fringe benefits were brought into the base of personal 
income tax which closed many loopholes that were previously exploited by taxpayers. In the 
case of company tax the introduction of STC also broadened the tax base. 
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 Oupa Magashule was Commissioner of SARS from 2009 until his resignation in July 2013. 
25
 This is according to the so-called Laffer effect according to which “higher tax rates will not necessarily 
produce more tax revenue, since the tax base will shrink as taxpayers reduce their work effort in response to the 
higher tax rates” (Black et al., 2011, p.217.) 
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During the second phase the base of VAT was broadened to include all financial services 
based on a fee (See Section 3.2.2.2.d.). Capital gains tax and the introduction of the residence 
principle also made income from a foreign source taxable under PIT and CIT. 
3.3.3.2 Income taxes 
a) PIT 
In general, the decrease in marginal rates of personal income tax means that the tax system 
has become more efficient because the theoretical excess burden decreases more than 
proportional to the decrease in the tax rate. This reform was necessary because of the 
increasing globalisation of the economy and the drive towards tax harmonization. It forced 
South Africa to review the competitiveness of its marginal rates of PIT in the face of the 
brain drain it faced, as a means of preserving its skilled labour force. 
Taxing fringe benefits under PIT also closed important loopholes in the system and allowed 
for greater economic efficiency due to improved neutrality. This put a stop to the preferential 
treatment of individuals who were in a position to receive fringe benefits, such as overseas 
holidays, because it is the higher income earners who get fringe benefits. 
The elimination of formal gender discrimination with the imposition of a single tax rate 
structure on all individuals, irrespective of gender or marital status, enhanced the efficiency 
of the South African tax system. That is because the higher tax rates on married women 
compromises economic efficiency as the MTR is responsible for the substitution effect. Due 
to this effect, women might have decided not to participate in the labour market and it might 
have affected their saving behaviour. According to Budlender, Casale & Valodia. (2010, 
p.209) this reform has led to an increase in the participation of women in the labour force, 
although there are fewer women in the labour force in comparison to men. 
The highest marginal rates of PIT in countries with similar economic circumstances to South 
Africa like the United Kingdom, Germany and Brazil have also shown a decrease between 
1990 and 2010. In Brazil the highest MTR by 2010 was 27.5%, in Germany it is 45% and had 
actually increased from 42% in 2006; and in the UK it is at 50% increasing from 40% in 2009 
(KPMG, 2013). Although comparing well to the UK and Germany, South Africa is in a worse 
position compared to Brazil, a country also classified as an emerging market economy. 
Compared to other countries South African tax rate is rather high: 20% in Egypt; 25% in 
Uruguay; 28% in Malaysia and 13% in Russia. This raises other questions like whether the 
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top MTR of South Africa is low enough to attract highly skilled workers into the country. 
Glenday (2008: p.8) is of the opinion that South Africa’s top MTR is reasonable when 
compared to OECD countries where the top marginal rates range from 19% to 59.7%. 
Considering an increase in the rate of PIT for the taxpayers in the higher tax brackets for 
redistributive purposes was not feasible, because they are very sensitive to increases in tax 
rates (they could emigrate, evade taxes, work fewer hours, retire early etc.), which could 
significantly affect tax revenue and economic efficiency (Steenekamp, 2012b, p.13). This 
conforms to the findings of Hagemann, Jones & Montador, (1988, p.187) that increases in 
labour taxation leads to decreases in labour supply because the after-tax return to the worker 
is less than the cost to the employer, driving a wedge between the before- and after-tax 
returns. This clearly shows the complexity of tax policy in terms of the tradeoff between the 
principles of equity and efficiency. 
b) CIT 
The reductions in corporate tax rates and the STC decreased the excess burden on companies 
and made these taxes more efficient. 
Another very important reform to improve economic efficiency of the tax system was the 
effort to bring the highest marginal rate of PIT in line with the nominal rate of company tax. 
This reform is in accordance with second lesson from conventional wisdom as stated by 
Musgrave (See Section 2.3.2.3). The lesson is that the rate of CIT should not be lower than 
the highest marginal rate of PIT. If it were lower, individuals would exploit the opportunity 
for tax arbitrage and form companies to benefit from the lower tax rate. 
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Table 3.7 Comparing top MTR and Company tax rates 1990 - 2010 
Year of 
Assessment 
Flat 
rate on 
taxable 
income 
% 
Rate of 
STC 
Top 
Marginal 
Tax Rate 
on Personal 
Income 
1990/91 50 - 44 
1991/92 48 - 43 
1992/93 48 - 43 
1993/94 40 15 43 
1994/95 35 25 43 
1995/96 35 25 45 
1996/97 35 12.5 45 
1997/98 35 12.5 45 
1998/99 35 12.5 45 
1999/00 30 12.5 45 
2000/01 30 12.5 42 
2001/02 30 12.5 42 
2002/03 30 12.5 40 
2003/04 30 12.5 40 
2004/05 30 12.5 40 
2005/06 29 12.5 40 
2006/07 29 12.5 40 
2007/08 29 10 40 
2008/09 28 10 40 
2009/10 28 10 40 
Source: SARS, (2012, p.12-22) & SARB (2012, p.90) 
As is clear from Table 3.7 above, from the fiscal year 2000/2001 the rates of PIT and CIT 
stayed close together. During the first phase of tax reform, when the flat rate of company tax 
was much higher that the top marginal rate of PIT, it should also be kept in mind that the 
effective rate of company tax at that time was much lower that the nominal rate. 
Because the flat rate of company tax was brought down through these phases of tax reform 
and also because the STC was being phased out, the possible excess burden improved more 
than proportionally. These reductions brought the tax rate on companies in South African also 
more in line with tax rates in the countries of it’s trading partners. As explained earlier, 
globalisation caused greater mobility of skill and capital and it was important to make tax 
changes in accordance with international tax practice. Section 2.3.2.3 also referred to 
Musgrave’s second lesson, reinforced by globalisation, according to which tax rates in 
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countries that are dependent on foreign capital, should not be higher than in countries that 
export the capital. 
Table 3.8 compares the rate of CIT in South Africa to the rates in countries that are major 
exporters of capital to South Africa. 
Table 3.8 Top company rates for the United Kingdom, United States, Germany and South Africa 
Year of 
Assess-
ment 
UK US Germany South 
Africa 
Rate of 
STC 
(SA) 
  % % % %  
1990 34 34 50 50  
1991 33 34 50 50  
1992 33 34 50 48  
1993 33 35 50 48 15 
1994 33 35 45 40 25 
1995 33 35 45 35 25 
1996 33 35 45 35 12.5 
1997 31 35 45 35 12.5 
1998 31 35 45 35 12.5 
1999 30 35 40 35 12.5 
2000 30 35 40 30 12.5 
2001 30 35 25 30 12.5 
2002 30 35 25 30 12.5 
2003 30 35 26.5 30 12.5 
2004 30 35 25 30 12.5 
2005 30 35 25 30 12.5 
2006 30 35 25 29 12.5 
2007 30 35 25 29 10 
2008 28 35 15 29 10 
2009 28 35 15 28 10 
2010 28 35 15 28  
Source: CESIFO, 2013 and SARB (2012, p.90) 
Table 3.8 illustrates the trend of decreasing rates of income tax on companies, except for the 
case of the US where the rates remains relatively stable. However, what is clear from the 
table is that when STC is included, the rate of company tax in South Africa, as a capital-
importing country, is much higher than the rate in countries that are the traditional exporters 
of capital to South Africa. From 2010 the situation looks much better and the South African 
position is much more competitive. Although other factors such as profitable opportunities 
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are much more important to attract foreign investment flows the tax increased the relative 
cost of doing business in South Africa. 
Over the years, as explained in Section 3.2.2.2 (b) various tax incentives were also introduced 
to support the corporate sector. These incentives, such as for the automotive industry, were 
intended to support specific industries and to strengthen the potential for longer-term growth. 
However, tax incentives distort economic decisions and increase the excess burden 
(Kransdorff, 2010, p.78). That is because some activities will be pursued more than others not 
because of their competitive advantage, but because their profitability is artificially enhanced 
due to the incentives. In South Africa’s the motor industry has lived this dilemma. It has cost 
government about R700 000 million to maintain the viability of the sector when this money 
could have been invested in more productive projects (Kransdorff, 2010, p.78). Tax 
incentives, although they may serve important purposes, have decreased the economic 
efficiency of the South African tax system. 
c) CGT 
As discussed earlier in Section 3.2.2.2 (c) the introduction of CGT made the system more 
efficient because it decreases investments distortions (South Africa. National Treasury, 2001, 
p.4). According to Black et al (2008, p.182) the introduction of CGT was an important step to 
protect the “integrity of the personal income tax”. Not taxing capital gains encouraged 
individuals to invest their savings in assets that gave returns of capital gains instead of 
income-producing assets like machinery and equipment. This would in turn lead to the 
misallocation of resources (South Africa. National Treasury, 2001, p.11). Therefore, the 
introduction of capital gains in South Africa has ruled out the differential tax treatment of 
different assets thus increasing economic efficiency. However it can also be argued that the 
CGT decreases the economic efficiency of the South African tax system because it results in 
decreases in economic growth by decreasing investments and savings which encroach on 
entrepreneurial activity and risk-taking. 
Even though the revenue from CGT can be relatively small, CGT acts as a backstop to the 
income tax (Steenekamp, 2011, p.41). From the time of its inception, CGT has managed to 
collect R27 074 million Rands. 
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In 2009/10 government collected of 4.4 billion Rands in revenue, about 2.1% of taxes on 
persons and individuals (Steenekamp, 2012a, p.43). It was a huge attempt because the 
appreciation on all investment assets was fully untaxed. 
3.3.3.3 Indirect taxes 
a) VAT 
VAT is considered an efficient tax, because it does not distort consumer choices. However, 
zero-rating of basic foodstuffs, which was intended to make the tax less regressive, renders 
the tax less efficient as it may distort consumer choices. Consumers may choose to increase 
their consumption of the zero-rated items just to enjoy the cheaper prices. 
In addition, the potential increase in the VAT rates also causes distortions because increasing 
the tax rates may create incentives to purchase in neighbouring countries where the rate is 
lower, although this problem is being addressed through international tax treaty obligations. 
b) Excises 
The sin taxes on cigarettes and alcohol are Pigovian taxes imposed to internalize the negative 
external impact on the community by using these products. Taxing the ‘sinners’ is supposed 
to internalize the negative externality by increasing prices which is supposed to discourage 
the use of these harmful products. In this way sin taxes will enhance economic efficiency. 
But, the demand for these products is probably relatively inelastic, which means that the 
excess burden would be relatively smaller, and according to the inverse-elasticity rule
26
 this 
would also increase economic efficiency. 
On the other hand, Black and Mohamed (2006, p.136) claimed that sin-taxes can be seriously 
distortive, which negatively affects economic efficiency. They argued that “… “sin” tax hikes 
may adversely affect the welfare of household members other than the head, either directly 
through a re-allocation of the household budget, or indirectly through higher health expenses 
caused by the substitution of cheaper and lower quality alcohol and tobacco products for 
higher quality products.” These distortive effects should be a serious matter of concerns in 
South Africa given the extent of addiction under some poorer communities. 
Increases in the excise rates for luxury goods are also distortive because it shifts consumption 
away from luxury goods due to the high prices. 
                                                 
26
 See Section 2.2.1 
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Last, increases in the fuel levy may be distortive causing the individual to decrease the 
consumption of fuel. However it is also efficient in that although its main aim is not to 
account for its negative environmental effects, the decrease in consumption would reduce the 
amount of air pollution from gas emissions from cars. However, a study by Mabugu, Chitiga 
and Amusa (2009, p.291), shows that the welfare effects of increasing the fuel levy to 
account for environmental externalities is rather insignificant. In order to internalize the 
environmental effects caused by fuel consumption, it is not enough to just increase the fuel 
levy. The industry and agriculture sectors need to be included in the environmental policies 
aimed at reducing pollution (CEEPA, 2009, p.4). 
3.3.4 Equity Considerations 
As discussed in Section 3.2 various reforms since the 1990s were supposed to enhance the 
impact of the South African tax system on income distribution. Calitz & Siebrits, (2003, p.70) 
mentioned that according to a study by the Department of Finance, overall the South African 
tax system is progressive. The study analyzed the incidence of PIT, VAT, excise duties and 
fuel levy, and found out that the lowest income earners spend 11% of their income on the 
these taxes, compared to the richest that spend up to 30%. 
The following sub-sections discuss the impact on income distribution of the individual taxes. 
3.3.4.1 Income taxes 
a) PIT 
In South Africa, PIT is progressive and is based on the ability-to-pay principle (Black et al, 
2005, p.169). This is fair on the grounds of vertical equity. An empirical study by 
Steenekamp (2012a, p.44) shows that PIT was less progressive between 1997 and 2000 and 
then the extent of progressivity increased between 2000 and 2009 (Steenekamp, 2012a, p.47). 
However, a study by Nyamongo and Schoeman (2007, p.487) revealed mixed results on the 
equity impact of PIT. Using the Musgrave and Thin method, they found that there was a 
decline in progressivity from 1994 to 2004, whereas when using the Kwakwani method it 
showed that there was a significant increase in progressivity between 1994 and 2000 and then 
a decrease was apparent between 2000 and 2004 due to the application of the tax reforms. 
The results are rather mixed in evaluating the extent of progressivity of PIT in South Africa. 
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The imposition of a single tax rate structure on all individuals, irrespective of gender or 
marital status, enhanced the equity of the South African tax system by eliminating explicit 
formal gender discrimination (Valodia & Smith, 2001, p.29). 
It was mentioned earlier that fringe benefits became taxable. Therefore, the taxation of fringe 
benefits enhanced vertical equity because the richer, that had more ability to pay, were being 
taxed based on the benefit principle of equity. They enjoyed the use of company benefits 
without paying tax. Taxing these fringe benefits made the tax system more equitable. 
The high revenue collection from fiscal year 2002/03 onwards allowed the government to 
grant substantial relief to taxpayers with R44.4 billion accruing directly to individuals 
between the 2007/08 and 2011/12 periods (South Africa. National Treasury & SARS, 2012, 
p.3; SARB, 2013, p.21). Tax relief was granted especially by decreasing PIT rates. 
Significant tax relief in real terms was provided to low- and medium-income taxpayers. The 
tax relief to individuals in these income groups counteracted the impact of bracket creep, 
which occurs when incomes increase with inflation whereas tax thresholds are left 
unchanged, putting these individuals on higher tax brackets and reducing after-tax income in 
real terms. 
This relief impacted positively on income distribution. However, it did not reach the really 
poor. They did not benefit from the tax relief under the PIT, as their incomes are below the 
tax threshold and consequently, they do not pay tax. The tax thresholds have been increasing 
steadily since the beginning of the period under study. This allowed for greater equity 
because people who are poor should stay out of the income tax net, and this was achieved by 
keeping them below the tax threshold. 
Duncan (2011) claims that after the financial crisis of 2008/09, there will need to be an 
increase on the taxes of the richer in the years to follow to push up the “redistributive thrust 
of the budget”. In addition, the most affected taxpayers (the rich) enjoy very little of the 
benefits of paying such high taxes as most make use of private schools, health and security 
services (Duncan, 2011). 
b) CGT 
Capital gains tax made the system more equitable according to both vertical and horizontal 
equity as well as on the ability-to-pay and benefit principles, as referred to in Chapter Two. 
That is because people with a greater ability to pay, in this case the owners of the capital 
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gains, should bear a relatively higher burden of tax. Otherwise, these owners of capital gains 
would be paying just as much as the middle- or low-income earner, while having a higher 
income than them, rendering the system less progressive (South Africa. National Treasury, 
2001, p.10). In opposition to this, Vivian (2006, p.84) adds that it is not enough to have the 
ability-to-pay, taxpayers need to have the ability-to-bear the burden of taxation. The state 
should have a balance between its revenue-raising objective and the right of the individual to 
survive (Maroun, 2011, p.438). The concept of vertical equity in CGT undermines the 
concept of what is economically efficient. It is not enough to quantify the ability-to-pay as a 
feasible justification for the application of CGT. 
Vivian (2006, p.84) argues that the CGT is also an unfair tax, because the individual is taxed 
on income and on capital. He points out that since personal income is already taxed, all other 
taxes that are paid from after-tax income is a form of double taxation. He adds that taxes 
should be on income and not on capital and that income that is of a capital nature should be 
subtracted from total income. 
3.3.4.2 Indirect taxes 
a) VAT 
VAT is a regressive tax because people at lower income levels pay a higher percentage of 
their incomes in terms of VAT. The addition of financial services to VAT in 1996, made the 
tax less regressive, because richer people are the ones that use services relatively more often 
than the poorer population. This improved vertical equity in the tax system because the 
wealthier citizens who made use of financial services were being taxed according to the 
ability-to-pay principle as the rich have higher abilities. 
According to Jansen, Stoltz and Yu (2012, p.1) possible increases in the rate of VAT was 
seen as unfair according to the strong resistance of the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU). COSATU went as far as requesting that tinned foods be zero-rated as 
well to further counteract the regressivity of the tax. The Katz Commission (1996, p.9) was 
investigating a possible increase in the standard VAT rate and also the possibility of 
differential rates to allow for greater equity. The Commission decided against differential 
rating due to lack of administrative capacity in SARS. 
The provision for zero-rating on some basic foodstuffs is allowed in order to help the poor, in 
an attempt to reduce the regressivity of VAT. However, according to National Treasury & 
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SARS (2008, p.117) only a third of the total amount of foregone revenue from zero-ratings 
benefits the bottom half households in the income distribution. Therefore, according to the 
South African government, no further foodstuffs will be zero-rated in South Africa (RSA, 
2008, p.42). 
Logically, richer households gain more in absolute terms as they spend more, as pointed out 
by Jansen, Stoltz and Yu (2012, p.21). However, to determine the impact on equity, it is the 
relative position that needs to be considered. Jansen, Stoltz and Yu (2012, p.16) add that 
zero-rating decreases the VAT burden of the lower income households by 18%, whereas it 
decreases the burden of the highest income groups by 6%. They also investigated whether the 
zero-rated basket is optimally targeted. They focused on vegetables as a food category and 
found that vegetables can be divided into fresh (basic and luxurious types), frozen and tinned. 
According to their findings frozen vegetables should remain zero-rated, tinned vegetables that 
are presently taxed should be zero-rated and luxurious fresh vegetables should also be taxed 
at the standard rate. They concluded that the zero-rating can be improved by targeting 
foodstuffs that are used proportionally more by poor households. They also reiterate the 
recommendations by the Katz Commission (1996, p.9) and by Cnossen (2003, p.3) that zero-
rating should be regularly reviewed in order to optimally benefit the poor (Jansen, Stoltz and 
Yu, 2012). VAT thus remains an unpopular tax that which is perceived as unfair. Glenday 
(2008, p.5) agreed, stating it is unlikely that there will be any significant increases in VAT in 
the medium term in light of COSATU’s strong opposition to this change, which means that it 
will not be politically responsible to increase the rate. 
Increasing the VAT rates and/or eliminating zero-rates would not be a feasible move for the 
government, both politically and economically. This would reduce their political favour 
among voters and cause further resistance to reforms of this nature. 
b) Excise Taxes 
An empirical study by CEEPA (2009) concluded that although adding an additional amount 
to a sin tax, like an environmental tax for fuel, is feasible in reducing the fuel consumption 
and the pollution from its consumption, sin taxes like a fuel levy are regressive because the 
people at lower incomes pay a relatively higher part of their incomes in terms of the tax. 
There are mixed views regarding the increase in the fuel levy. First, as already mentioned, it 
is regressive. CEEPA (2009, p.3) goes further to state that such a tax would not impose an 
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unfair burden on the poor and can actually be progressive because the percentage of 
household income spent on fuel increases as total household expenditures increase. 
3.3.5 Macroeconomic Considerations 
3.3.5.1 Total tax burden 
Table 3.9 Tax revenue as % of GDP 
Fiscal 
Years 
% of 
GDP 
1994/95 22.9% 
1995/96 22.6% 
1996/97 23.2% 
1997/98 23.6% 
1998/99 24.4% 
1999/00 24.1% 
2000/01 23.2% 
2001/02 24.1% 
2002/03 23.5% 
2003/04 23.5% 
2004/05 24.9% 
2005/06 26.3% 
2006/07 27.4% 
2007/08 27.8% 
2008/09 27.0% 
2009/10 24.5% 
Source: South Africa. National Treasury and SARS (2008, p.17) and (2010, p.39) 
Note: Earlier tax statistics not available from SARS. 
As can be seen from Table 3.9, the total tax burden has gradually increased over the period of 
review, except for the fiscal year 2009/10. Duncan (2011) claimed that only 12% of South 
Africans pay tax, but 30% receive social grants. According to him the rich are too heavily 
taxed and the poor are taxed too lightly. Sanlam Chief Economist Laubscher (2013) agrees 
that the tax burden in South Africa is already too high and mentioned that the burden is likely 
to increase, considering the present fiscal stance (Laubscher, 2013). A too high tax burden 
may negatively affect the perception of foreign investors. Laubscher (2011) previously 
suggested that the fiscus should avoid tax rate increases and rather focus on managing 
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government expenditure. De Waal (2009) mentioned that public service employees should be 
encouraged to accept salary increases below the inflation rate. 
3.3.5.2 Foreign direct investment 
Tax arrangements and changes may impact on FDI flows. Did the tax reforms in South Africa 
have a positive impact on the much needed FDI flows? Calitz, Wallace and Burrows (2013, 
p.21) concluded that in South Africa a reduction in the corporate tax rates would be more 
effective in attracting foreign investment than the tax incentives already in place, because 
these have failed to bring foreign investment into the country. 
In South Africa tax incentives have not been successful in attracting foreign investment 
(Kransdorff, 2010, p.78). Duncan (2011) argues that government should rather decrease the 
bureaucracy as well as the minimum wage because red tape and high minimal wages shift 
activities into the informal sector. This makes one think that in the case of South Africa, Bird 
(2008, p.8) was right in concluding that tax incentives are generally a bad idea. One of the 
reasons is because the tax policy in place is not competitive (Kransdorff, 2010, p.74). 
A different example in South Africa is the automotive industry which received much 
government support through a group of incentives known as the Motor Industry Development 
Programme (MIDP). This industry is particularly successful due to high amounts of 
incentives from government. Although it can be argued that the effects of incentives diminish 
with time, it is unlikely that incentives of this proportion do not affect the choices of investors 
(Oxfam, 2013). 
3.3.5.3 Economic growth 
With regards to the impact of the tax reforms on economic growh, Koch, Schoeman and Van 
Tonder (2005, p.208) concluded that South Africa’s approach to economic growth by 
lowering tax rates and broadening the tax base could pay economic dividends, which may be 
mitigated by the improvements in tax collections. The authors add that recent dcreases in 
income taxes should result in a decreased tax burden. 
Following the financial crisis, the tax relief to the amount of 6.5 billion Rand was provided 
for households in the lower income brackets to stimulate consumer spending in order to 
sustain economic recovery (South Africa. National Treasury, 2010, p.14). In this way taxes 
were used in an anti-cyclical manner. 
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The South African government’s countercyclical response to stimulate growth was 
furthermore ensuring that spending levels on social and economic services were maintained 
although tax revenue was decreasing. The surplus funds for the year 2007/08 allowed South 
Africa to not have to raise taxes or cut spending in the short term and this decreased the 
economic and human costs of the recession. However, Laubscher (2013) warns that this will 
increase the tax burden and encourage dissaving in the future because increases in 
government spending to counteract the global crisis are not sustainable as there will be a need 
to increase revenue to support the budget. 
3.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the major changes to the South African tax system through the 
different phases of the reforms. It also explained the economic rationale behind the reforms in 
terms of the standard principles of taxation. During the first phase, following the work of the 
Margo Commission, the most significant reform was the replacement of the GST with VAT. 
Frnge benefit also became taxable under PIT and marginal rates of PIT were decreased. 
During the second phase, following the work of the Katz Commission, the most important 
reform was the establishment of SARS, which contributed greatly to administrative 
efficiency. Other major reforms included the further reduction of the marginal rate of PIT as 
well as the rate of CIT in order to comform to international tax practice and make the South 
African system more competitive. This was important because of brain drain and the need to 
attract foreign investment flows. Other reforms during the second phase included the 
introduction of the residence-based principle and CGT, which contributed to the economic 
efficiency of the tax sytem and also positively impacted on its effect on income distribution. 
Financial services became taxable under VAT, which further improved the equity of the 
system. 
The last part of the chapter looked at whether the government achieved the goals as intended 
by the reforms. In most cases the administrative and economic efficiency as well as the equity 
of the South African tax system was enhanced throughout the two phases of reforms. 
There should be further studies to analyse the impact of the changes in the tax structure of 
South Africa on the macro-economic variables like inflation and job creation. In particular, 
the effect on small business should be studied because small businesses were supposed to be 
encouraged by the tax system to employ more labour. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
4.1 CONCLUSION 
This study focused on tax reform in South Africa since the 1990s, a period during which 
many countries made major changes to their tax systems. 
Chapter One presented the problem statement, research question, objectives and organisation 
of the study. The main aims of the study were to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
most important changes to the South African tax system during the period following the 
Margo Commission’s report up to 2010, to investigare the rationale behind the reforms, and 
to answer the question whether the intended objectives of the reforms were achieved. 
Chapter Two provided the theoretical rationale behind tax reforms: administrative and 
economic efficiency; the impact of the tax system on income distribution; and to bring the 
system in line with international tax practise. In the case of developing countries tax systems 
are also reformed because new governments have new goals and need to attend to the wishes 
of the voters; because of declining aid flows; and, most important, because of globalisation. 
Due to globalisation and increased internatiaonal tax competition, developing countries 
reform their tax systems not to lose capital and scarce skills. Policy-makers in developing 
countries have to also consider the following special features: generally weak administrative 
capacities, low per capita incomes and the importance of informal sectors. 
Tax reforms in South Africa over this period occurred in two phases: the first being the 
period following the report of the Margo Commission, and the second that following the 
work of the Katz Commission. The most notable changes during the first phase were the 
introduction of VAT to replace the GST. This improved the revenue-raising capacity of the 
tax system as VAT is an efficient revenue collector due to its self-policing features. The 
increasing contribution of VAT since its introduction more than compensated for the 
decreasing contribution of trade taxes; however the fact that the VAT rate has stayed constant 
since 1993 is an indication of the unpopularity of the tax. Over the years, various studies have 
confirmed the regressive impact of the tax. 
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The establishment of SARS was a major institutional reform that contributed significantly to 
the administrative efficiency and revenue-raising capacity. This is evident from the increase 
in the collection of tax revenue over successive years. Other important reforms during the 
second phase were the introduction of capital gains tax, of the residence principle and of the 
decrease in MTRs of PIT as well as the flat rate of CIT. The first two of these reforms 
contributed to the broadening of the tax base, enhanced economic efficiency and improved 
the fairness of the system. The highest MTR of PIT was brought in line with the company tax 
rate and this decreased the possibility of tax arbitrage and the extent of avoidance, which 
contributed to decreasing the tax gap. The extent of evasion and avoidance by individuals is 
still high but according to the literature tax compliance by individuals has increased. 
Significant tax relief to middle and lower-income earners over various years improved the 
impact of PIT on income distribution; however it did not improve the position of the really 
poor who are not liable for PIT. What was significant for the poor is that the tax threshold 
was adapted regularly over the years, which enhanced the equity of the tax system. 
The phasing out of the secondary tax on companies together with the decrease of the rate of 
CIT increased the attractiveness of South Africa for capital-exporting countries. However, the 
effective tax rate on companies in South Africa was still relatively higher over most of the 
period, which negatively affected the competitiveness of the country to attract FDI flows. 
According to the literature, South Africa did not really succeed in attracting foreign 
investment over the years under study, even with the tax incentives in place. In addition, tax 
compliance by companies in South Africa is low. 
In conclusion, experts warn against the increasing tax burden. The fact that it is likely to 
increase even further in future, to generate sufficient revenue to sustain higher levels of 
government expenditure, may scare off foreign investors and negatively impact the potential 
for further economic growth in future. 
4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. To better evaluate the macroeconomic impact of the tax reforms further research 
should be encouraged on the impact of tax reforms on macro variables such as 
economic growth, inflation and job creation. The latter is particularly relevant in the 
case of small business because they were encouraged to create employment. 
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2. Further research should also be done on the relative cost of tax compliance as well as 
the tax gap. 
3. As was recommended by the Katz Commission, the basket of zero-rated foodstuffs 
should be regularly reviewed. 
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